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AN EXAMINATION OF R.C. SNYDER'S THEORY OF
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

by



BRIAN LEONARD JOB

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance,
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ABSTRACT

In 1954, R.C. Snyder, working with H. Bruck and B. Sapin, published a monograph entitled "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," thus introducing a new framework for foreign policy analysis. Subsequent literature was devoted to expanding upon, criticizing, and applying Snyder's framework. This thesis examines these writings and discusses weaknesses in Snyder's theory, and difficulties found in attempting to apply this schema to actual decisions.

Section I constitutes a synopsis of decision-making analysis, its assumptions, and the construction of a framework for the study of foreign policy upon them.

Section II deals with: (a) the theoretical problems of attempting to prevent judgements and assumptions of the researcher (observer) in any analysis, (b) the confusion introduced by Snyder's "combination" of the sociological and the psychological levels-of-analysis, (c) the difficulty of studying "motivation" in foreign policy (Snyder's "because of" -- "in order to" distinction is questioned), and (d) the argument that the framework contains an implicit model of "rationality".

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Section III reviews attempts to apply the decision-making framework. Criticism centers on the absence of hypotheses or linkages between the variables, and the inclusion of variables in the framework which cannot be operationalized. Modifications in Snyder's plan are suggested.

INTRODUCTION

This work centers around R.C. Snyder's writings on the application of the "decision-making" approach to the field of foreign policy study. (In this brief introduction, terms such as "decision-making" will remain undefined; however, such looseness will not, hopefully, prevent the reader from grasping a general idea of the scope and intent of what is to follow.) Working with various co-authors, Snyder published several articles and monographs explaining his notion of foreign policy decision-making -- the first and most significant being a research monograph in 1954 for the Princeton Center of International Studies, entitled "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics".¹ This was succeeded by a more general article in 1958,² a specific attempt to apply the decision schema to a foreign policy decision -- the Snyder and Paige analysis of the Korean decision³ -- and a return to more theoretical problems in two collaborations with J.P. Robinson -- a monograph for the New York Institute of World Order,⁴ and an article in H.C. Kelman's book, International Behavior.⁵

Despite the interest and criticism that the original work provoked on the part of other scholars, decision-making analysis has not been adopted by any other major writers in the international field, and except for the work of Paige on the Korea case, the decision-making technique has not been utilized in any other major case studies. This is unusual

given the fact that critics admitted that Snyder had devised a most comprehensive, original, and suggestive frame of reference. Such attractive features were still inadequate to induce others to adopt the Snyder approach and attempt to refine, alter, or expand upon his original efforts. It was this curious situation which provided the incentive for the present investigation. Given that decision-making was not being used to any appreciable extent in the contemporary literature, perhaps Snyder's initial praises were a bit exaggerated. If this was not so, then perhaps modern writers had forgotten or ignored what could be a most helpful research method. Or, as a final but probably most realistic idea, either the decision-making schema proved on subsequent examination by other authors to be unsuitable or unwieldy when one attempted to "operationalize" the concepts involved; or there exist substantial, but not easily seen, weaknesses in Snyder's theoretical foundation which mitigate against a conscientious scholar's use of the decision-making method.

Indeed, this last-mentioned alternative could be viewed as the briefest possible of outlines for that which follows. Section I will present a condensed, but hopefully clarified, exposition of the major assumptions, terms, and concepts in Snyder's writing. The majority of this material will be based on the first study by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin in 1954. When other works either contradict or explicate more clearly than the initial study, they will be introduced

and mentioned. Furthermore, Section I will attempt to remain strictly reportative; although the writer acknowledges that the concept of the "perfectly informed, objective reporter" remains a goal rather than an achievement of most writers in political science.

Section II of this study will concentrate on carefully exploring the theoretical assumptions of Snyder's framework. Without prejudicing later discussion, the writer feels that there are serious problems in any work which advocates, and attempts to operationalize, the "phenomenological" principle that any event must be reconstructed entirely from the perspective of the actors involved. Any analysis, of necessity, is done by an "outside" observer; and it is not only unlikely, but it will be argued, methodologically impossible for the judgements of this observer not to enter into the inquiry. The phenomenological perspective also has ramifications in other areas of Snyder's theory -- which attempts in his terms to combine into a single framework the sociological and the psychological variables in a decision-making situation.⁶ It will be argued that the phenomenological point of view restricts the theorist to the individual-actor "level-of-analysis" (crudely defined as a "point of view") and that important weaknesses stem from Snyder's attempts to combine two distinct levels-of-analysis. These theoretical problems are evident in those portions of his theory that consider the role of the individual's

personality in the decision-making context. For this reason, and also because it is one of the most interesting aspects of the theory to the present writer, some time will be spent examining, criticizing, and analyzing Snyder's assumptions on motivation. Tied very closely to this investigation will be a second look at the "rationality" assumptions of Snyder's work; for even though he is adamant in denying that any are present, I will attempt to show that the analyst using Snyder's method cannot help but impose "semi-rational" models of decision-making actors onto the real situation that he is studying.

The reader will perhaps wonder if this portion of the study does not stray unnecessarily far from the foreign policy considerations which were important to Snyder. However, if examination at a more basic theoretical level reveals problems and difficulties in the Snyder formulation, then as Marion Levy maintains, these must be first corrected if international theories are to be worthy of the name, and if international policies are ever to be amenable to integration into more broad interdisciplinary concerns such as sociology and psychology.⁷

Finally, Section III will deal with foreign policy per se. Discussion will center on the applicability of the Snyder approach to case studies. Thus, emphasis will be placed on the operational qualities of Snyder's variables, especially as evidenced in the one major case study

consciously applying his methodology, i.e., the Korea decision. Indeed, this case study will support the central argument put forward; that serious problems exist in operationalizing the variables as presently set out, and that some general modification must be undertaken if decision-making analysis is ever to be utilized more fully. Immediate difficulties arise when someone suggests modifications in the original theory; for these are not feasible without case applications, which in turn are not likely before theoretical modifications. Hopefully some way can be suggested out of this circular inertia; the idea of typologies will be offered as a somewhat cautious first step.

The reader searching for detailed and major conclusions is to be disappointed in that a study of this nature does not promote any grandiose statement as to the utility or non-utility of Snyder's decision-making. Rather what is aimed for is a thorough discussion of both the strong and weak points of the Snyder framework, possibly leaving the reader interested enough in foreign policy decision-making to study this area further, hopefully trying to implement some of his own and my suggestions.

SECTION I

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin were critical of certain aspects of the then contemporary international relations literature and commenced their study with what was to be a short exposure of the difficulties existing in other works. Presumably, their framework was a reaction to these weaknesses and purported to avoid or overcome them. With some abbreviation their discussion was centered on three main points.

First of all, Snyder (usually the names of co-authors will be omitted in the text) felt that political scientists were failing to make a proper distinction between factual material and interpretable opinion.¹ He did not suggest that the latter had no place in scholarly literature, but rather that the two should not be inter-mixed without discrimination by an author. Succinctly phrased, Snyder maintained that the "what is" was to be kept separate from the "what ought to be"² -- both to the advantage of other political scientists, who could then use the same objective data to formulate their own opinions, and to policy-makers who presumably could see precisely on what foundations their solicited advice was based. Thus, in international politics, a description of the events preceding World War I was not to be interspersed

with the author's opinions concerning the causes of the major conflict.

Closely associated with the above point was Snyder's second objection to those writers whose works contain implicit rather than explicit assumptions.³ These usually are related to the political scientist's research methods; for example, an investigator could assume, but not mention, that the personality of the statesman does not influence policy outcomes. Subsequent readers could therefore interpret his findings to mean that the people involved played an insignificant role in the events -- whereas this may not have been the case in fact. Authors are occasionally tempted to use implicit assumptions to escape problems of unavailable data, or to save time and energy in analysis. The overall effect of such activity is to prevent others from re-analyzing the same material with the aim of re-affirming or rejecting the original findings. Unless all assumptions about data, human behavior, and environment are made clear, the reader and researcher are unaware or misled about factors which may be influencing the final outcome.⁴

The third problem found in international relations literature also concerned the proper conduct of research but centered on those studies which lacked "researchable issues" and operational definitions.⁵ Snyder was here objecting to the person who designs a study, raises hypotheses concerning

his material and yet bases these hypotheses on concepts or issues which cannot be investigated. Most usages of the phrase "national interest" are guilty of this fault, and cannot be calculated or verified. Also involved are cases of the "mistaken employment of metaphors."⁶ Snyder felt that the term "equilibrium", for instance, is applicable to physics but meaningless in a testable sense in international relations. Perhaps the most common occurrence of this problem was the reification of the nation-state.⁷ More precisely, "England", for example, would be given qualities and characteristics as an actor; whereas the word when "properly" used is an analytical abstraction, or substitute for the individuals in the territory and their behaviors. Snyder argued that by committing these faults, political scientists limited their opportunities for concise and accurate research and literature.

In order to avoid these areas of difficulty, Snyder's approach to international politics contains a great deal of background material -- not all essentially concerned with international politics. The basic assumptions are sociologically oriented, making the rudimentary decision-making schema adaptable to other contexts besides foreign policy. Beginning from the point of the social scientist faced with analyzing any series of issues or events involving human activity, Snyder holds that there is a fundamental choice to be made between dynamic and static analysis.⁸ The latter

method is utilized in the description of conditions at a distinct point in time -- structural-functional analysis is offered as an example. The investigator can indicate the condition of a "system" at an initial and at a later time; however, he cannot attribute observed changes to the activity or absence of any particular agent or property. Only with dynamic analysis, process analysis being synonymous,⁹ can one study a sequence of events or a process of change over time and as a result adequately perceive why a particular result arose from a succession of behaviors. (It should be noted that Snyder does not delineate the notion of causal explanation which he is introducing. Suffice it to say for now that he maintains that explanation, the attribution of causes, the "why" of behavior, is possible only under some conditions of ongoing or continuous observation of behaviors.)¹⁰

A further division is created between interaction and decision-making -- the two types of process analysis.¹¹ Whereas interaction can be described and measured, and the results of such studies indicate patterns and quantities of activity, Snyder argues that only decision-making can indicate or explain the causes of a particular phase or outcome of the studied behavior. Admittedly, Snyder has not given any hint as to what "decision-making" really is; however, the purpose of the previous series of definitions has been to place decision-making into a specific context as a method

of social science analysis. Moving on to an examination of decision-making per se, Snyder borrows substantially from the terminology and conceptualization of Parsons and Shils.¹²

Basically, decision-making deals with human beings in social situations, acting upon and reacting to each other and their surroundings -- in other words, what has been called social action analysis.¹³ To clarify the essential concept in this phrase, Snyder says that "action exists (analytically) when the following components can be ascertained: actor (or actors), goals, means, and situation."¹⁴ The term "actor" is used instead of the more familiar phrase "person" to emphasize that investigation is not based on the entire personality and affairs of the individual, but rather only on those behaviors and facets of personality which appear, and in turn affect, the issue or situation under consideration. Hence "situation" could be refined to refer to "a pattern of relationships among events, conditions, and other actors organized around a focus which is the center of interest for the decision-makers."¹⁵

Dispensing with Snyder's sociological jargon for a moment, what remains is the idea of people involved in situations which present alternative courses of action and different outcomes. Thus, the choice arrived at, i.e., the alternative selected, is the decision -- and hence decision-making analysis. Several important assumptions become

apparent when the matter is phrased in the preceding manner. First of all, man, the decision-maker, is functioning in an uncertain environment in that his activity within it is largely the result of his freedom of choice in decisions which do not occur or resolve themselves in any pre-determined fashion. (The point being that Snyder rejects what the Sprouts have termed "environmental determinism" and other forms of environmental influence on behavior which preclude or over-ride human choice.)¹⁶ But following from this tenet is the notion that man does not undertake activity in a random or indiscriminating fashion. His action is "planful" in that he is attempting to achieve specific aims and he is further attempting to minimize the achievement of the detrimental aims of others.¹⁷

This returns the discussion to the concept of the situation, and the focus thereof. Clearly, "the focus" of the situation is that particular decision, or problem, in which various actors have an interest in developing to the point of an outcome or solution.

Furthermore, the situation itself begins and develops not from the objective properties of the environment, but rather from the subjective perceptions of this environment by the decision-makers. Each actor's action (to use a circular phrase) arises out of his own individual "definition of the situation", i.e., the way he views the factors

which he believes are relevant in that specific context.¹⁸

Snyder adopts a phenomenological approach for decision-making analysis, which means that the environment affects and determines decisional outcomes only through its first being perceived and then being a relevant determinant of the actor's behavior. He mentions that certain "environmental limitations" such as technology and natural conditions may affect the outcomes of the decision-makers' behavior. But he hastens to add that they (the environmental limitations) do not impinge on his previous behavior in choosing a course of action. To reiterate: What is important is what the Sprouts term the "psycho-milieu", i.e., the environment as it is perceived and reacted to by a particular individual.¹⁹ It is the task of the analyst of decision-making to reconstruct the situation as defined by the decision-makers. Snyder wishes to avoid, at all costs, the introduction of any judgements or interpretations of behavior or environmental conditions by the analyst -- or rather, the observer. Only in this manner can be achieved what Snyder terms an explanation as to "why" a particular event occurred.

Once a case has been chosen for study, interest is centered on the actors and

(a) their discrimination and relating of objects, conditions, and other actors . . .; (b) the existence, establishment, or definition of goals . . .; (c) attachment of significance to various courses of action suggested by the situation according to some criteria of estimation; and (d) application of "standards of

acceptability". . . .²⁰

To introduce yet another label, it is this calculation and discussion which is termed the "intellectual process of decision-making," as contrasted to the "organizational process of decision-making" concerning an examination of which persons and structures are involved.²¹

The reader may have noticed that to Snyder the decision-maker is never alone in a situation-- he is working with or against others in the selection of alternative actions. However, the matter is taken one step beyond that of a number of people acting together, to the idea of formal groups of actors participating in decision-making. The analyst is dealing with social systems characterized by personnel who have special duties, specific responsibilities, and who operate in some hierarchical fashion -- in other words an organization.²² Only after introducing this last concept does Snyder formulate a definition of "decision-making" as

a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers.²³

The analyst looks at a sequence of activities (of decision-makers) centered around an event -- or focus of attention of the decision-makers. Included then are conceptions of calculation, choice, and implementation; the

word "project" in this sense referring to both means and ends adopted in order to facilitate a desired outcome.²⁴ Having established the basis of decision-making, and indicating the various types of behavior involved, one necessary point remains in the matter of the selection of the group of actors to be analyzed. This, however, follows from the "focus" of attention, i.e., that issue which the decision-makers are dealing with. The analyst's unit of observation consists of the organization of actors who are isolated by virtue of their particular concern and interest in a specified question.

It is possible now to begin to apply decision-making phenomena to international affairs and foreign policy. First, a few cautionary remarks on the scope of Snyder's ambitions in this regard are prerequisite. The authors wished to make it clear that they were not offering decision-making as either a panacea for, or an escape from, the difficulties and challenges associated with international politics.²⁵ Decision-making was advocated as a perspective on certain aspects of international politics, namely foreign policy decision-making. Furthermore, it was admitted that decision-making does not encompass international relations, and it follows that other methods are more suitable to other areas of study.²⁶

The 1954 monograph attempted to present a "frame of reference" for the study of foreign policy. By this

was meant "a conceptual scheme" or guide to research; and the aim was to give explicit conceptualization of all major terms involved, to list the relevant factors or variables in any decision -- how they were to be characterized and relationships among them were to be explored. Most importantly, an adequate frame of reference was to suggest orderings of the variables and indicate hypothesized relationships among them as a first step toward specific case-study research.²⁷ The schema was to be operational, predictive, and efficient; and hopefully was to avoid the pitfalls Snyder found in other international politics literature. The focus of the frame of reference -- the central approach determining the methodology used -- was, of course, decision-making, and therefore a majority of time was spent on the adaptation of more general ideas like decision, situation, and unit of observation to a foreign policy context. It must be noted that this resulting schema was not regarded as a general theory -- a sharp distinction being drawn between theory, which consists of deductively-connected laws and which allows explanation and prediction -- and a conceptual scheme which is a first venture into a field and consequently deals with explaining what are supposed to be relevant variables and hypothesized connections between them.²⁸

Proceeding now to decision-making and foreign policy. First of all international politics is defined as

"the actions, reactions, and interactions among political entities called national states."²⁹ A state is further regarded as a "collective actor", meaning the analyst is not looking at say "Canada's" behavior, but rather at the activities of all those various people who act on behalf of Canada, i.e., the decision-makers. To emphasize this point Snyder states: "State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers."³⁰

In any particular study, the investigator first chooses his state, then the decision or issue he is interested in. This provides, as was mentioned before, the focus of the study and allows the delineation of the unit of observation by pointing out all those actors active in the consideration of alternative outcomes. However, Snyder also specified that decision-making takes place in an organizational context, and thus the unit of observation becomes the members in that official foreign policy body charged with reaching a solution to that particular issue being studied. At this point Snyder adopts a somewhat Eastonian view of politics, by requiring that decision-making deal only with authoritative action or allocation. And furthermore, only action through legitimate organizations, delegated with explicit authority. Snyder does not deny that others (the general public, and individual, unofficial actors excluded by this restriction) are not influential

in a decision. He circumvents this objection by arguing as follows:

I do insist that only decisions actually made by public officials are politically authoritative. A decision (by any other group) . . . may be very significant politically and it may affect or be binding on certain persons, but it is not binding on the community politically organized. Furthermore, I know of no way that such nongovernmental decisions can be shown to have consequences for governmental decisions without accounting for the behavior of official decision-makers.³¹


To move on to the actual decisional process, it is helpful to adopt the following analogy from psychology. Consider the decision-making actor as the "organism" perceiving "stimuli", i.e., the pressures or conditions of his environment, to which he (or the organization) reacts with particular "responses" in the form of foreign policy decisions on behalf of the state. Another way of looking at the question is in terms of inputs and outputs. The inputs correspond to the perceptions by the decision-makers of their environment; the outputs are the foreign policy outcomes. The ultimate, long-range goal of Snyder and other decision-making analysts is to be able, on the examination of the inputs or stimuli, to predict and explain the resultant outputs in any specified situation.

There are three main divisions to the decision-makers environment or setting:³² the internal setting, the external setting, and the decision-making context itself. The internal setting refers to domestic aspects such as

public opinion, cultural and societal features, national and local politics -- even geography.³³ On the other hand, external setting is defined as perceived "factors and conditions beyond the territorial boundaries of the state, the actions and reactions of other states (their decision-makers)."³⁴ The final factor which receives the most emphasis from Snyder is the influence of the decision-makers' immediate organizational surroundings, i.e., the rules, functioning, and interaction of the group. Leaving this third area for a moment, probably the best manner of understanding the internal and external settings is through a diagram which lists the numerous variables impinging on the decision-makers. The schema on the following page closely resembles that of Snyder, Brock, and Sapin. It is significant that these internal and external aspects receive really no more than scant attention by the original authors. Beyond roughly sketching the various factors involved, no attempt is made to specify how concepts such as "public opinion" are to be operationalized. However, a probable explanation of this briefness lies in the fact that these "outer" factors are subsequently processed in an altered and selective manner.

Returning to the decision-making setting, which takes up the remainder of Snyder's work, a division is made into the three major determinants of action which arise in the organizational environment -- spheres of competence,

A SUGGESTIVE LISTING OF SOME VARIABLES TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS



[Adapted from Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 72]

information and communication, and motivation.³⁵ It should be pointed out that the three variables represent both individual and group properties. Snyder is making an attempt to co-ordinate psychological and sociological constructs into a unified explanation. The reader will notice, therefore, that occasionally the analyst will be considering numbers of actors and their perceptions, but at a different moment discussion will be centered exclusively on the behavior of a single actor.³⁶

Snyder's definition of competence is burdened with jargon: "A competence is defined as the totality of those of the activities of the decision-maker relevant and necessary to the achievement of the organizational objective."³⁷ What he essentially means is this: In any organizational group there exist sets of rules, both official and unofficial, which influence the functioning and output of the group. The operation, for example, of the State Department "desk" officer is regulated by formal assignments of duties, patterns of authority, and designations of responsibility. Snyder regards these as prescribed or formal characteristics of the organization. However, modifications to these factors occur through the operation of the group's informal rules such as group norms, familiar customs, friendships, and "unwritten codes" of activity. The very difficult concept of "bureaucratization" falls into both the informal and formal categories of competence, with structures of

legitimate authority and responsibility being official rules, and the side-effects of tradition and the influence of precedents, or the inertia of large numbers of people being informal determinants. The investigator must examine effects these factors have on the individual decision-maker, keeping in mind that the actors have a governmentally-specified office, a socially-defined role, and an individual interpretation of the office and role. All are important because the analyst must reconstruct the situation as defined by the decision-maker. Presumably, the notion of competence arises from this interaction of the individual's personality and capabilities with his official position and unofficial place in the decision-making setting.

Information and communication, the second aspect of the organizational setting, are areas which Snyder passes over quickly.³⁸ There exists a very large literature in business-administration and firm management which is applicable, but is not specifically introduced into the framework. Two distinct interpretations of communication are possible. For instance, on a basic level, communication is requisite to the foundation of any social system. But for Snyder's purposes, communication will be considered as a variable influencing behavior by the openness or restrictiveness of message transfer, by the existence of communication channels and nets, and by the various "types" or "styles" of messages circulated in the organization. The alternative selected in

a decision may be affected, for example, by the speed or absence of communications between decision-making actors or groups.

Information may be construed as the qualitative or content factor of communication in the situation. This, however, deals not only with the material which is available to the people involved, but also with their perception of this data. In Snyder's view, the latter aspect is more important, because it highlights the distinction he wishes to draw between what the observer sees and what the participant regards as relevant to his activity. Only the latter, perceived factors, are important to decision-making. Information may be characterized by its source, by its type (i.e., its being related to the decision, to the internal nature of the group and so on), or by the amount of "noise" involved in messages; "noise" being defined as irrelevant or incorrect information introduced by the passage of messages from actor to actor.³⁹ Snyder maintains that the analyst must consider these factors or variables when examining a foreign policy organization.

The last determinant of action -- motivation -- receives a great deal of consideration in the 1954 monograph, probably because the authors wish to tread lightly in what is the most important but most difficult analytical concept in the decision-making framework.⁴⁰ Roughly speaking, motivation is the "why" behind a person's or group's

behavior. If, as Snyder does, one wishes to "explain" the causes of individual activities, then motivation becomes the center of the framework, providing the essential link between the setting or the environment, and the resultant overt decision.⁴¹ Even after the analyst has carefully (and ideally speaking, completely) defined each decision-maker's definition of the situation, he still is not provided with a direct connection between these perceptions and images and the final behavior. Neither does he have any basis for telling how, or why, the situation was defined as it was in the first place. This "notion" of purpose, aim, or intent of human action (an impressionistic definition of motivation) must be inferred from the situation and is the key to understanding the decision-making phenomenon as seen by Snyder.

Foreign policy literature in the past dealt with motivation in a number of ways -- most being unsatisfactory. Usually, simplifying assumptions were built into the theory in an attempt to explain away the problem of inadequate data and investigation. Thus, in some studies a single motive, or several motives, were attributed to all decision-makers; in others all decision-makers were assumed to be identical, and in some the motivation or personality of one domineering figure such as Hitler accounted for the motivation of the entire state.⁴²

Another problem of motivation analysis is the

question as to exactly what or who is said to be motivated. Unfortunately, in this case Snyder is no more explicit than other writers. At times it is unclear as to whether it is an individual or a group which is motivated.⁴³ He also disagrees at one point to speak of motives as publicly expressed justifications for state activity.⁴⁴ This appears to contradict his earlier assertions that motives are the indicators of decision-maker's behavior. Despite these uncertainties, motivation is defined and generally treated as a distinctly individual concept. Thus, "motivation refers to a psychological state of the action in which energy is mobilized and selectively directed toward aspects of the setting."⁴⁵ Snyder is careful to delimit this definition by stressing that analysts are only concerned with the decision-maker as an analytical actor, and are therefore only interested in that portion of the person's psychology and behavior directly relevant to the situation under study.⁴⁶ Apparently this caveat removes the necessity of considering "innate drives" -- motives which are "inherent in the physiology of the organism."⁴⁷

A further simplification is introduced by the division of motivation into two kinds: "because of" and "in order to".⁴⁸ The former category refers to the actor's past experience, "the sum total of factors in his life-history which determine the particular project of action selected to reach a goal." Alternately, "in order to"

factors are those oriented around future expectations and are operative in cases where the behavior is motivated by "an end state of affairs envisaged by the actor."⁴⁹ Whereas "in order to" factors can be inferred from the immediate situation, "because of" motives must be accounted for by examining the past experiences of the actor. This would require a detailed and virtually psychoanalytic approach to decision-making which Snyder is most anxious to avoid. He seems to indicate that "because of" motivation falls into that category of innate or psychic drives which decision-making analysis need not consider.⁵⁰

Motives were basically defined as tendencies to respond to certain stimuli or environmental features in a particular way. To clarify this broad behavioral notion, Snyder breaks motivation into two components: attitudes and a frame of reference.⁵¹ The first term describes the initial propensity of the actor to react to a situation, the second refers to the precise motivation or response arrived at in that instance. Hence an attitude is a "readiness to be motivated"⁵² and is developed by the decision-maker prior to the event, as a result of his socialization, membership in particular social strata, membership in groups and his official organization, and past experiences. Psychological research attempts to reveal the content and sources of these attitudes. Once the researcher is aware of their existence, he can tell

what particular initial response will be, or was, provoked by the environmental stimuli.

The concept of a frame of reference comes into effect after the event has been initiated and shows how and why the actor responds in a particular manner. Typically, Snyder further compartmentalizes this motion into three behavioral areas: perception, valuation, and evaluation.⁵³ Perception applies to that process by which the actor receives and screens information from his environment. It is thus central to the creation of the definition of the situation of the decision-makers, for it determines the relevancies attached to the items and even previous to this, selects those items from the environment to be considered. Thus, perception, by its omitting, distorting, or supplementing the inputs from the environment, may create crucial discrepancies between the situation as viewed by the participant and by the outside analyst. This variable is an important facet of the phenomenological approach of Snyder.

The ideas of valuation and evaluation may be related to an earlier quoted passage which mentioned the concern of foreign policy investigators with goals, the attachment of significance to alternatives, and the ideas of preferences and standards of desired outcomes.⁵⁴ Valuation, to Snyder, refers to a more general outlook than evaluation, in that it concerns the wider range of objectives and values for

the situation as a whole. Whereas the latter term, evaluation, is that weighing, considering, and comparison of alternative courses of action, resulting in a final choice.⁵⁵ Another difference between the two concepts would be the organizational or societal nature of valuation, probably being a longer range consideration of national aims arrived at in a context prior to the actual decision-making moment; and the individually-oriented nature of evaluation referring to the selective behavior of each actor. It would be difficult to conceive of a group involvement in this "problem-solving" process, unless done on the basis of the contribution of individual actors to a larger, collective pattern.

Taking a short passage from Snyder: "To conclude, the frame of reference becomes a determinant of behavior after an attitude or attitude cluster has been triggered by a stimulus."⁵⁶ As mentioned, motivation, composed of a frame of reference and attitudes, is the crucial determinant of the decision-making output; but having outlined his framework, using the above variables, Snyder finds problems in specifying the types of data that the decision-maker is to examine. Certainly, attention and investigation to the group's functioning must be given, thus introducing various ideas of group interaction, participation, norms, etc. However, prior to dealing with the group action, the separate functioning of the individual

decision-makers must be considered, i.e., their personalities. Here, Snyder reverts to his earlier separation of "because of" and "in order to" motivation.⁵⁷

Emphasizing the latter concept, he stresses that a "sociological conception of personality" must be adopted, which centers on culture, socialization, group membership, conformity, and other group processes. Presumably, "because of" motivation represents a psychological notion of personality, but Snyder is not sure whether such unique psychic variables should be evaluated. At one point the approach to personality data was narrowed by rejecting "because of" motivational analysis, but later he states that idiosyncratic features of the decision-makers have a place as a residual category -- explaining those aspects of decision-making left open after an "in order to" or sociological treatment of the data.⁵⁸ Overlooking this ambiguity for the moment, the burden of Snyder's argument appears to be that the analyst should concentrate particularly on the actor in an organizational context, giving importance to roles, norms, group interactions and so on.

The decision-making framework comes to a somewhat abrupt conclusion at this point. Presumably all of the aspects involved in a foreign policy situation have been delineated; and thus Snyder and the authors have completed their task. No attempt to generalize, consolidate, or conclude is undertaken, possibly because the writers maintained

that individual studies of actual decisions were required to refine their extensive, but unrelated, list of variables. Snyder's eventual goal, of course, is the construction of an inclusive foreign policy decision-making theory, applicable not only to any nation state, but also in the study of any foreign policy decision.

SECTION II

As mentioned in the introduction, Section II will deal with theoretical issues in Snyder's decision-making approach. Of course, any such short study will be selective; but an attempt will be made to consider areas of significant importance both to those interested in theory construction and those occupied with actual foreign policy studies. Two major topics will be taken up first -- the observer-participant distinction, and levels-of-analysis -- and two topics dependent on this preliminary discussion -- motivation and rationality -- will occupy the remainder of Section II. Thus, this portion of the study will have two major and two minor parts; these will be labelled, not to suggest that the material does not overlap, but to indicate to the reader when a new series of ideas are being dealt with.

A. The Observer-Participant Distinction

Snyder found faults with previous writings in international politics, two of which he termed the mixture of interpretation and fact by the author, and the use of implicit assumptions by the researcher.¹ Basically, these matters are both symptoms of a problem common to all social science analysis, i.e., the observer-participant distinction. In any type of inquiry dealing with human actors,

there exists the researcher, also called the observer, and those people who are or were active in the studied situation -- the participants. The trouble occurs when the observer intentionally or unintentionally imposes conditions on the actors in the situation which will significantly alter his findings from reality. Snyder is suggesting that the observer may take an unwarranted liberty by telling what he thinks should have been, or was, the determinant of a participant's behavior; when instead the researcher should present all available data without bias. Subsequently, he can make a personal analysis, but he must make clear that the participant is no longer involved at this time. In the second instance, the observer may use assumptions in his research which restrict and alter the accuracy of his conclusions. Most likely, as mentioned before, some assumptions will preclude the study of relevant facets of the actors' behavior.

There are two areas where the observer's bias may become evident. By virtue of his isolation and distance from the actual events, the observer possesses more complete and impartial information about the environmental factors of alternative courses of action. This introduces the temptation to say that person X made a "wrong" decision, or "should have" made another choice. However, such comments are of little value, indicating the wisdom of hindsight but not explaining why the particular decision was made.

The second manner in which the observer intrudes upon or alters the participants' actual behavior is through the methodology he utilizes to study the situation. Certainly, it is evident that an observer is necessary, and that he must operate in some hopefully systematic fashion. However, the danger is in his adopting methods which circumscribe analysis (e.g. by avoiding the consideration of personality variables, and thus leaving out important information), or in using "models" or systems which impose values upon the participants, when they are in effect actually not present.²

Care has been taken in the above discussion to avoid the use of two words which immediately suggest themselves to such topics. These are "objective" and "subjective". However, their meanings are not always clear and furthermore they may be used in two different contexts, making their use often ambiguous. Referring to what could be termed Usage I, "objective" suggests unbiased, accurate reporting of data; whereas "subjective" describes material containing the observer's interpretation and normative suggestions. In Usage II both words apply to the participants' behavior: "objective" applying to actions which are observable, and "subjective" referring to data concerning the internal thoughts, feelings, and motivations of the decision-makers.³

Snyder maintains that to achieve his aim -- the explanation of the "why" of decision-making behavior -- the

researcher must employ the concept of the "definition of the situation." As indicated earlier, the situation is to be re-created and analyzed through the eyes of the decision-makers involved.⁴ What this amounts to is placing the observer "within" the participant; and thus Snyder is trying to solve the observer-participant distinction by attempting to combine the two viewpoints into one. The investigator considers behavior, information, or conditions only in the same manner as did the actual people involved. Therefore no interpretation of environmental factors, or introduction of "total" knowledge of an outsider, enters into the analysis of the causes of a particular decision. Using the definition of the situation is also supposed to preclude the use of assumptions by the observer that would or could alter the validity or comprehensiveness of his work. Snyder believes that this problem may be overcome by elimination; therefore he postulates a complete absence of preconceived notions, guides, or models of behavior, stating that it is necessary to observe in an unrestrained and complete fashion, and then, after gathering the data, to formulate explanations on this basis alone as to how and what was done.

To possibly clarify what Snyder wishes to do by using the terms "objective" and "subjective", the reader could say that Snyder's ambition is to avoid a subjective analysis (Usage I) by objectively (Usage I) considering the subjective (Usage II) data concerning the actors in the

situation. Objective data (Usage II) does not have any place in Snyder's plan because it may provide additional material which the decision-makers did not receive, or consider relevant, and thus did not influence their decision.

To become more theoretical and to re-introduce terminology used in Section I, the use of the "definition of the situation" is an adoption by Snyder of what is called the "phenomenological" perspective of social science.⁵ Perhaps the most clear and useful discussion of the topic as it applies to international relations is found in the Sprouts' book, The Ecological Perspective, in which two basically different perspectives of analysis are proposed.⁶

Human behavior may be viewed as being compelled by environmental forces -- hence the decision-maker is really a robot in a situation where he merely enacts the pre-determined role assigned to him. This most extreme formulation would be termed strict "Determinism" by the Sprouts;⁷ but there are modifications to this point of view which imply a limited choice on the part of the actor and more limited influences from environmental factors. These are labelled "Free-will Determinism" and "Possibilism".⁸ The important result of these associated approaches in the first group is that the perceptions, images, attitudes, motivations, etc. of the individual decision-maker do not need to be considered since they are not relevant to the explanation of the final decision.

However, this idea is unacceptable to many writers in the social sciences, who maintain, as Snyder does, that the actor himself is the crucial aspect in any situation. This second type of approach, contrasted to the environmental, is known as the behavioral perspective.⁹ The phrases "definition of the situation" and "phenomenological" typify the general idea of this latter concept. Therefore, the behavioralist studies the person, rather than his surroundings, and analyzes attitudes, values, preferences, perceptions, and motivations which determine the individual's perceived environment. (This is what the Sprouts refer to as the decision-maker's "psycho-milieu" or "subjective environment".)¹⁰ As has been continually stressed, only the definition of the situation provides the necessary and sufficient material for decision-making analysis.

I think it wise to consider briefly the objections of some political scientists who argue that some environmental factors must, whether realized or not, affect decision-making. Snyder is not perfectly clear here and at times appears to bend his phenomenological principle. Thus, at one point he says:

It should be noted that our conception of setting does not exclude certain so-called environmental limitations such as the state of technology, morbidity ratio, and so on, which may limit the achievement of objectives or which may otherwise become part of the conditions of action irrespective of whether and how the decision-makers perceive them.¹¹

I think that the key portion of this sentence, in Snyder's context, is "may limit the achievement of objectives" which implies that environmental conditions may influence or alter the planned outcomes of decisions. But the decision itself has already been taken -- the decision-making behavior to be studied has been completed before, and without any influence from these factors. H. and M. Sprout make a point of distinguishing between the setting which applies during decision-making -- the subjective environment -- and that which applies to the outcomes of the decisions -- the objective environment.¹² Thus Snyder, I would argue, quite correctly limits his analysis to those and only those inputs from the environment which are perceived by the decision-makers.¹³

Turning now to criticism rather than agreement with the original authors' use of definition of the situation and the phenomenological approach: Snyder felt that he had eliminated the role of the observer, and that he required or had no operational assumptions which could contaminate his research findings.¹⁴ However, these appear to be overly optimistic and untenable positions, not only from a practical point of view, but also from a methodological one.

The use of any perspective, indeed the conduct of any investigation of human behavior must somehow and somewhere include an observer. Certainly, the behavioral or phenomenological approach reduces the role of the observer;

but "it is methodologically impossible to dispense with the viewpoint of some observer."¹⁵ Speaking directly about the decision-making framework, the Sprouts comment:

Except for the situation in which a person analyzes his own perceptions, there is necessarily some observer on the scene -- else there would be no report and no analysis of the behavior. "Probing the minds of decision-makers in terms of their official behavior," a concept introduced early in the Snyder scheme carries inescapably a built-in observer who does the "probing." In the final analysis, reconstruction of the "world of the decision-maker," . . . assumes the existence of someone to perform the analytical operations involved.¹⁶

The point to be made therefore is how does the necessary observer enter into or affect the final report of the situation.

Snyder further wishes to maintain that the observer does not operate under any assumptions, and that the phenomenological perspective requires no pre-determined conception of human behavior of any kind. Once again it is methodologically impossible to avoid having assumptions about behavior when one utilizes a behavioral approach to decision-making. Every analyst requires some concepts of relevancy, some guidelines or model in order to facilitate a minimally systematic investigation. Snyder is perhaps over-emphasizing his fear of assumptions which lead to difficulties. He should rather concentrate on constructing a framework which utilizes and makes explicit an economic number of carefully thought-out assumptions.

It is argued that

the number and complexity of the assumptions which an analyst puts into his behavioral model will depend on his judgement as to what is necessary for a satisfactory explanation or basis of prediction. But so far as we are aware, every such model which pertains to more or less deliberative decisions . . . includes at the very least: (1) assumptions as to the actor's motivation and intent, (2) assumptions as to the quantity and quality of his knowledge of the milieu in which he is operating, and (3) assumptions as to his mode of utilizing such knowledge in defining alternatives and making decisions.¹⁷

It is important to note that these are some of the specific areas in which Snyder maintains that he has no such assumptions. However, I believe that it will be seen that he has indeed invoked a loose model of motivation and rationality, but this will be considered in the third and fourth portions of this section. Suffice it to say at this point that Snyder is theoretically required to have some model of behavior if he wishes to use any behavioral approach to decision-making. His framework would be more theoretically refined if he realized this and set forth his assumptions.

Also important is Snyder's argument that the judgements of the observer need not enter into the analysis of the situation; if the observer operates as prescribed, then all the relevant factors are covered in the definition of the situation. However, this is not practically possible. For example consider the initiation of any investigation, i.e., the specification of the unit of observation.

When the observer must specify who is to be included in the decision-making group; it is not perfectly evident who actually is, or was, involved in any situation. Ultimately it is necessary for the investigator to rely on his personal criteria of importance as to whether or not certain actors will or will not be included in the subsequent analysis. (Snyder is forced, at one point, to admit this.)¹⁸

The researcher continues to influence the decision-making approach; for if he complies with Snyder's guidelines and recreates a definition of the situation, he obtains a listing of involved variables which are unweighted and possibly unrelated. In order to explain the decision, these factors must be assigned relative importances and must be associated through hypotheses developed by the observer. The weighting of variables inevitably involves the use of standards and criteria of relevance; the observer cannot avoid exercising his own judgement in these instances. Indeed the construction of any type of decision-making theory is not possible without the employment of some personal discrimination in obtaining generalizations from preliminary data.¹⁹

The purpose of this section has been to indicate some areas in the Snyder formulation where I think that the authors took an overly optimistic point of view as to what they could avoid in the way of theoretical assumptions. The presence of an observer, plus some exercise of judgement by

this observer, cannot be dispensed with -- Snyder would be more accurate in suggesting ways and means to reduce this "outside" involvement, and to provide guidelines so as to make decision-making analysis as "objective" as possible under the circumstances.

I would further maintain that Snyder, like all analysts, has some model of human behavior and that this model closely approximates the "common sense probabilism" model discussed by the Sprouts.²⁰ I will examine this particular question more closely under those portions of this section dealing with motivation and rationality.

B. The Level of Analysis Problem

Before proceeding with the main argument of this topic, it should be noted that the basic concepts and problems to be discussed generally are associated with the field of philosophy of science. However, I will attempt to avoid using the terminology and literature of this latter discipline, since it introduces fundamental philosophical and definitional issues, the delineation of which are not necessary to make the points I feel are relevant to Snyder and foreign-policy decision-making.²¹

Without claiming to have derived an original or complete formula, I would regard "level-of-analysis" as a concept which refers to that category of subject matter that the analyst wishes to approach be it to describe, generalize,

or explain.²² Phrased in this manner, it is clear that the use of any level-of-analysis by a writer is a completely arbitrary choice; there are numerous possible levels and one does not select a level-of-analysis which defines his subject matter or data for him. Rather the reverse takes place, in that the researcher must first specify what it is he wishes to examine and this specification in turn tells with what level-of-analysis the person is working. Singer, in his article, speaks of two areas of subject matter in international organizations, etc., while the other concerns foreign policies, trading relationships and so on. Therefore, he proposed two levels-of-analysis -- the international and the national -- depending on which material the author was working.²³

Associated with "level-of-analysis" is the concept of "unit-of-analysis", already hinted at in the mention of Singer's article. A level-of-analysis is a categoric term and is thus "composed" of smaller parts or units. The researcher decides what his area of investigation is -- giving him a level-of-analysis -- and in turn decides what items within this category he wishes to examine. Thus, as Brody notes: "The choice of a unit-of-analysis is in effect an answer to the question: 'What do I measure or observe when I investigate the actions of nations. . . ?'"²⁴ Generally speaking, then, any researcher is automatically using some level-of-analysis (whether or not he states what it is)

comprised of units-of-analysis, which are actually what the individual is studying.

The literature in international relations contains few mentions of these concepts, and the majority of authors which do employ the idea of unit and level do so vaguely or incorrectly. Singer does not adequately define his terms or indicate the reason or function of their usage, and further may be criticized for taking too narrow a viewpoint on the idea of a level-of-analysis.²⁵ Given that he admits to many possible levels-of-analysis,²⁶ the greater portion of his discussion treats only the broad international and national areas, appearing at times to suggest that these are the only alternatives in the field of international relations. On the other hand, North et al adopt the opposite extreme and locate six different levels-of-analysis.²⁷ However, they seem to suggest that these levels are arranged in a hierarchical fashion, and that the subject material of one may only be approached properly through, or by way of, the level below the one chosen for study. As I attempted to indicate before, there is nothing arbitrary either about the use of a level-of-analysis or unit-of-analysis; furthermore, these authors (North et al) would appear to have difficulty in distinguishing an institution from an organization, group, or other focus of examination.

Possibly the clearest conception of the terms is taken by the philosopher of science, who would maintain a

distinction between only two levels-of-analysis -- the individual actor and the collective entity.²⁸ Turning to foreign policy in order to illustrate this division, one could conceive of the decision-maker as one level-of-analysis, the units-of-analysis here being the inputs from the environment, and the various attitudes, motivations, and perceptions involved in the person's reaching a decision. Other levels-of-analysis could be the foreign-policy decision-making group, or the state's entire policy machinery, or the international state system. However, it is apparent that all except the individual decision-maker are in effect groups of persons, or collectives -- and thus represent the second level-of-analysis.

The reason for these two particular levels, and indeed the relevance of levels-of-analysis to international theory including Snyder, will come clear. When speaking of singular units (i.e., individuals), the analyst can usually isolate and handle those factors that contribute to behavior -- so-called individual properties. But when studying a group entity, there is the danger of creating "group properties" which are not in effect the result of the behavior of individuals in the group.²⁹ Such concepts have no theoretical foundation in that something like a "group mind" cannot be isolated, verified, or precisely defined. Kaplan refers to this problem as the "mystique of 'wholes' according to which these are more than the sum of their

parts, the parts being individuals and the whole being the entity presumed to be labelled by the collective term."³⁰ Levy, writing directly about international politics, terms this error as it applies particularly to the nation-state "the fallacy of reification" and/or "the pathetic fallacy" which is "the attribution of human traits to analytic structures . . . or to concrete structures that are not human."³¹

Thus, this "mistake" is seen in writings which describe the nation-state as a person, ultimately leading to characteristics of mind, motivation, will, interest, and so on. It makes no sense to attribute psychological and human processes to the collective term "state", which performs no activities by itself. This is exactly what Snyder objected to in the reification of the state, and he was correct in maintaining that state behavior cannot be seen as other than the behavior of the decision-makers or people acting on behalf of the state.³²

On the other hand, this argument should not be taken to indicate that collective terms, or levels-of-analysis which involve them, are to be avoided or that explanations are not valid when they are used. Without exploring the intricacies of this area, it can be held that one must be aware of the pitfalls involved, but also must be prepared to conceptualize group properties which do not lead to reification.³³

Perhaps the most simplistic, yet useful, answer to the level-of-analysis problem is proposed by Singer and Brody who suggest (quoting the latter) that what is required is "an awareness of the problem and an explicitness about one's choices."³⁴ The analyst must be self-conscious of the level-of-analysis at which he operates and realize the postulates or assumptions that are inherent in each.

Wolfers devotes an article to what he conceives to be the three different methods of accounting for international relations.³⁵ First, the nation-state may be conceived to be a separate and complete entity, secondly, the national state's behavior may be accounted for by the actions of the entire population of individuals in the state, and thirdly, the behavior of the state may be really the result of the behaviors of key individuals in the state referred to as decision-makers. Wolfers continues on to discuss the assumptions which exist at each viewpoint. About the first he says:

[If] nation states are conceived of as the sole actors, it is inevitable that they be treated as if endowed, like human beings, with wills and minds of their own that permit them to research decisions and carry them out. . . . States must be thought capable, for example, of desires and preferences, of satisfaction³⁶ and dissatisfaction, of the choice of goals and means.

This is exactly what the philosopher of science and Snyder are trying to avoid, namely the reification of the analytical concept of the state. Therefore, Snyder accepts the

third of Wolfer's focii.³⁷ Wolfers, commenting on the assumptions adopted by the decision-making theorists, states that they

insist that decisions and actions taken in the name of the state cannot be understood unless one penetrates to the individuals from whom they emanate. . . . Thus, differences in such individual psychological traits as motivation, value preferences, temperament and rationality are considered essential variables, and so are differences arising from affiliation of individuals with particular parties, agencies within the state, or with peoples of different culture.³⁸

Snyder most clearly selects decision-making as his level-of-analysis, rejecting outright the notion of the personified state, and as mentioned before, seeing no purpose in considering other than authoritative decision-makers. However, this is not the end of the matter; for Snyder most definitely still has level-of-analysis problems.

His theory tends to obscure the question as to whether it is the individual's or the group's behavior which accounts for the decision. Furthermore, at times Snyder appears to violate the collective-individual distinction which is basic to the level-of-analysis concept by inter-mixing ideas such as individual motivation with the nebulous notion of "group motivation". This occurs because the national foreign policy decision is not exclusively the result of either individual or group interaction. Snyder does not adequately organize his theory or set out his concepts so as to avoid confusion between these two types of

focus. Brody states that "these difficulties stem from the emphasis on a single actor in the face of the clearly contradictory situation, namely that decisions are not made by single individuals but rather by groups of individuals in organizational contexts."³⁹

The decision-making framework as it stands attempts to combine sociological and psychological levels-of-analysis. Indeed Snyder admits exactly this, ("[Decision-making is an] attempt to combine in a single conceptual scheme two levels of analysis -- the individual . . . and the group or organization. . . .")⁴⁰ He also admits that this introduces numerous problems because each level involves different analytical assumptions and different types of data. The individual (psychological) level-of-analysis contributes rationality and motivation assumptions, while the collective (sociological) level-of-analysis involves group interaction assumptions.⁴¹ The two are not compatible simultaneously in the same theory. This is exactly the point of the individual-collective distinction or what Singer also calls the "micro-macro" problem.⁴²

It is interesting to note that Snyder never mentions that he is aware of the above concerns; but he does regard his attempts to combine sociological and psychological levels-of-analysis as preventing him from calling decision-making a theory, in that it does not proceed from clearly defined assumptions.⁴³ He apparently feels that there is

no other technique to use, and that strict theoretical considerations must be sacrificed.

Further complications arise through Snyder's use of the phenomenological perspective which should bind him to the use of only the individual level-of-analysis. He wishes to recreate the situation as perceived by individual decision-makers; hence, it is not possible to recreate or conceptualize the perception of an entire group as a single entity.⁴⁴ Definition of the situation is operational only for specified individual actors; to work with a group it is necessary to construct "definitions" for all the individuals involved, then switch to a sociological level-of-analysis to consider the interaction of these formulated individual viewpoints. The crucial point here is that a definite and distinct break must be made in moving from the phenomenological-individual-psychological level-of-analysis to the collective-sociological level-of-analysis. Attempting to assimilate both perspectives into one amorphous approach is not theoretically sound.

Snyder is perhaps under the same misconception about levels-of-analysis as Brody accuses Singer of formulating.⁴⁵ "A fixity of focus" (i.e., level-of-analysis) is not required throughout one large theoretical framework unless of course the entire material fits properly into a single area. When, as in decision-making, the subject matter clusters around several levels-of-analysis, it is proper and

admissible to utilize different perspectives in different instances, providing the researcher is aware of his position at any moment.

My suggestion in this area is not therefore that Snyder's usage of levels-of-analysis is entirely wrong. Certainly he is most careful to eliminate any reification of the state, but his attempt to combine sociological and psychological concepts promotes a problem with levels-of-analysis, not involving states, but concerning the creation of untenable group properties. This is particularly noticeable where Snyder deals with the psychological properties of the decision-maker. Thus, the next portion of this section will consider motivation and rationality in decision-making in an attempt to apply some of the issues raised about the observer and the level-of-analysis.

C. Motivation

In Section I the important role that motivation played in the decision-making theory was emphasized; and it became evident that to Snyder this was the key notion of explanation in his schema. During the previous discussion of this Section, however, problems with the methodology of dealing with personality variables have been raised. It is the purpose of the following brief investigation to re-examine Snyder's use of "motivation", because I feel that he adopts an argument which attempts to explain away, without consideration, various difficulties.

Because "motivation" refers to the particular reason or "drive" (psychologically speaking) that influences the decision-maker to act as he does, it provides a linkage between the decision-maker's perception of his situation, and his resultant behavior. Without such a concept the analyst is left with a vacuum between the environmental inputs and the decisional outputs of foreign policy, and thus has nothing on which to establish an accurate account as to "why" a particular decision was reached.⁴⁶ Earlier I mentioned the idea of a stimulus-response analogy for decision-making; it may be wise when considering motivation to modify the S-R to an S-O-R analogy where the "O" now represents the intervention and mediation of the decision-maker's personality or motivation between the setting and the selection of a final course of action.

When dealing with levels-of-analysis, it was pointed out that care must be taken not to associate strictly individual or phenomenological concepts with other than individual actors. Along these lines, then, motivation is a concept best restricted to the individual level-of-analysis in that one cannot easily conceive of or construct a "group motivation". Unless such an idea is carefully related to the motivations of the individual members of the group, the researcher has committed a "fallacy of reification". Similarly, of course, to speak about the motives of a state as an entity in itself is not possible.

Generally Snyder is careful how he characterizes motivation and avoids the problems mentioned above. However, at one point he introduces the idea of motives being "acceptable justifications for present, past, and future programs of action"⁴⁷ put forward by the state's foreign policy bodies. It is not altogether clear as to whether Snyder regards these statements as actual individual motives, or as influences upon individual decision-makers, or as a somewhat nebulous group motivation, or as a concept of state motivation (which would be theoretically unsound). This is an ambiguous passage in the monograph which, if pursued further, could lead to difficulties. However, leaving aside these possibilities for the remainder of the discussion, it is apparent that Snyder emphasizes that motivation is to apply to individuals only; and given his broad interpretation of the term it can be extended to cover all effects or variables arising from the individual personalities present in the decision-making situation.⁴⁸

If the reader recalls Snyder's previous attempt to combine the psychological into the sociological level-of-analysis, the division which is now made between "in order to" and "because of" motivations is essentially a continuation of this same argument. "In order to" motivations are related to the future expectations or goals of the actor as a member of the foreign policy group, whereas "because of" motivations are distinctive to each individual and are

determined by each decision-maker's past experiences or life-history.⁴⁹ To Snyder, each person may be conceptualized in three fashions -- physiological, psychological, and sociological; thus "in order to" motivations correspond to the sociological, while "because of" motivations refer to the psychological aspect of the actor. Decision-making analysis requires only the sociological conception of personality, i.e., "in order to" motivations.⁵⁰ On the other hand, "because of" motivations are not to be used, since they require a psychoanalytical examination of each actor which Snyder appears to suggest does not yield satisfactory results.⁵¹ The reasoning behind this direction is not made explicit; the reader is not told whether psychoanalytical studies cannot yield adequate evidence for theoretical reasons, i.e., the investigator cannot probe the minds of others; or do not prove fruitful because the analyst will never possess sufficient data; or lastly are not worth the trouble involved since individual characteristics never prove relevant in the group decision-making situation.

I believe that Snyder, if pressed, would opt for the last-mentioned idea; however there are occasional suggestions in his writings which support the second argument -- that data would be lacking for a thorough inquiry.⁵² In keeping with the idea that "because of" motivation is not of sufficient importance, the analyst is not interested in pursuing ideas such as innate drives or psychic

tendencies of the decision-makers. Even more innocuous material such as the educational, class, and political backgrounds of the actors is classified as idiosyncratic variables, to be considered only as residual information.⁵³ This means that one is to examine "in order to" motivations first, and whatever does not correlate between these findings and the resultant behavior of that person may be attributed to the unexamined "residual" idiosyncratic factors.

A number of issues have been raised which deserve comment. First of all, Snyder's distinction between sociological and psychological motivation appears to be on shaky theoretical foundations.⁵⁴ I think that he does not make clear what he chooses to involve in his so-called sociological conception of personality -- and if he did so, would find that the concept tended to confuse rather than clarify. By "sociological personality", in this instance, Snyder does not imply any sort of personality of the group; this would obviously contradict the individual-collective separation found in level-of-analysis considerations. What he is trying to do is emphasize the influence and effects on the individual of the group situation in which decision-making takes place. Thus variables such as group norms, conformity to group ideals, the presence of formulated national or group goals, etc., play a most important role in determining the motivation of any member of the group. Since this is what Snyder wishes to stress, I would argue

that it would be much more clear to speak about group influences or pressures upon the individual -- and thus avoid a terminology which apparently suggests that we are talking about a different personality when speaking about the "sociological conception of personality".

As was argued with the levels-of-analysis problem, it would be better to first analyze and create a separate definition of the situation for each individual and then switch to another level-of-analysis, i.e., the sociological, to further discover how these decision-makers interacted to arrive at their final course of action. The same reasoning could be applied to Snyder's conception of personality in that the analyst should first consider the individual's personality, paying particular attention to the influences of the group (and to appease Snyder for the moment, avoiding an analysis of idiosyncratic factors). After having done this, he should then examine the activity of these people in the group, now possessing the material which should allow for generalizations and explanations as to why a decision was reached in the manner it was.

A more serious problem occurs in Snyder's restriction of idiosyncratic factors to a residual area where it is not required to analyze them. In a framework that aims to delineate all the variables affecting any decision, it seems presumptuous to state prior to examination that one class of variables is not to be studied.⁵⁵ Snyder suggested

before that previous writers in attributing one or a few motives to all decision-makers without discrimination were explaining away their problems by attempting to cover up their lack of methodological technique or reliable data.⁵⁶ By designating all "because of" motivations to be of minimal import, Snyder is in effect doing the same thing (certainly, to a lesser extent). It is interesting to note that Wolfers, with whom Snyder took serious exception, argued that the decision-making approach was of no value because there was no point in testing the various psychological assumptions at the basis of this theory -- that the findings would merely confirm the previous writings which were governed by the state-as-a-sole-actor approach.⁵⁷ Wolfers takes a somewhat dogmatic and extreme viewpoint; however, there is a possibility that by so carefully restricting what should be considered in the area of motivation, Snyder too may be expressing an overly-narrow opinion. Harsanyi interjects a cautionary note along the same lines, stating that it is possible to introduce so many assumptions and limitations on the analysis of the decision-maker, in order to gain simplicity in explanation, that in effect nothing is explained.⁵⁸ The decision-making framework does not do this, but the bypassing of "because of" motivations remains a matter to be studied rather than assumed.

Snyder's discussion of motivation can, I think, lead to conclusions which are not psychologically valid.

Following his procedures, it would appear that if one could explain a decision on the basis of "in order to" motives, one could also conclude, without examination, that "because of" motivations did not influence those particular actors. This need not be so, since the decision-maker may be acting in accordance with group processes but only because the resultant outcomes satisfy his inner or psychic drives or motivations. Amato's research into the personality types involved in foreign-policy decisions, for example, could suggest that the militant or "hawk" in the United States Department of State may be behaving in this manner to conform to his Department's notion of the national interest or to satisfy personal tendencies of authoritarianism or hostility.⁵⁹ As de Rivera comments:

there is a tendency to invoke psychology only when the abnormal occurs. . . . In fact, of course, the individual is always present; and a correct perception, or a particularly creative one is just as psychological and reflects individual values just as much as a distorted view of reality. . . . One danger of taking psychology for granted is the danger of failing to see that things could have happened differently if man had behaved differently -- something he is quite capable of doing when he achieves an awareness of his determinants.⁶⁰

I feel that little needs to be added to this position; however, the Snyder-supporter may argue that if the decision can be adequately accounted for with "in order to" motivations, that is sufficient. The alternate and perhaps correct information relating to a particular decision-maker through "because of" analysis then becomes irrelevant.

Snyder, himself, would reject this easy way out, for he continually repeats his desire to construct the actual definition of the situation and further to achieve a genuine explanation of the decision. In establishing a theoretically complete framework "because of" motivation must be considered.⁶¹

(The reader may have noticed that a distinction relevant to the above discussion is the idea of conscious and unconscious motivations. Snyder does not give this matter the attention which it deserves; however, more will be said of this later.)

To continue on in a somewhat different manner, I now intend to examine an article by S. Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System".⁶² This article is considered a standard work by international relations theorists, but I think it indicates what I wish to criticize in the Snyder approach. At the same time Verba gives some extremely insightful analysis of the effects of group processes on decision-making -- specifically appropriate to a modified "sociological conception of personality" that Snyder could adopt.

First of all, a distinction must be drawn between two possible ways of speaking of rationality. There is the "rationality" which refers to a method of reaching a decision, involving the weighing of alternatives, the

consideration of outcomes, and the decision as to which course of action best satisfies the individual's expectations or "utilities". This concept is employed as a guide or standard of analysis by the game-theorist, by the economist, and in a modified fashion by the social scientist.

However, there is another usage of rationality or rational which I believe is ambiguous at best. Verba, for example, conceives of the term in a rough psychological fashion to describe behavior which is based on "cool and clear-headed means-ends calculation".⁶³ "Rational", "conscious", and "logical" are synonymous adjectives for decisions motivated by unemotional "objective" considerations. The individual actor has no psychic influences or motivations. Conversely, "non-rational", "non-logical", and "unconscious" motivations are "influence[s] acting upon the decision-maker of which he is unaware and which he would not consider legitimate influence[s] upon his decision if he were aware of [them]".⁶⁴ Verba introduces even more terminology by distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate motives, the latter referring to any personal drives or ambitions which do not further the collective goal of the group or nation.⁶⁵

Converting this phraseology to that of Snyder, the "in order to" motives would correspond to the logical and appropriate; while Verba would regard "because of" motives as non-logical, non-rational, and inappropriate. He could

not, however, equate "because of" motivation with unconscious motivations and here the comparison fails. Indeed, if anything becomes evident, it is that neither author has formulated a clear conceptual format. Verba's notions of the rational and non-rational break down on the same point as did Snyder's conceptions, i.e., the presence of unconscious influences on the decision.

Continuing with Verba's argument for a moment to illustrate his difficulties; his first hypothesis is that the more involvement a decision-maker has with foreign-policy decisions, the more evident and influential will be his unconscious and non-logical motivations.⁶⁶ (This appears correct, if only in the elementary logical sense of stating that increased opportunities generally should entail a proportional increase in instances of specific behaviors.) Then Verba goes on to suggest that with more information, more time, and more skill the decision-maker's non-rational, non-logical motivations will enter the situation to a lesser and lesser extent.⁶⁷ But this does not follow since to Verba the term "non-logical" means the same as "unconscious". Certainly factors such as increased information and skill make it less likely that decisions will be reached on the basis of personal opinion in the absence of facts or capabilities. However, the addition or deletion of any conscious factors in no way affects the activity of unconscious motivations or drives -- in fact, this is

the essential meaning of "unconscious". Verba's reasoning is parallel to Snyder's relegation of "because of" motivations to a residual category. Both are attempting to explain away difficult problems of motivational analysis.

The discussion here may be strengthened by a relevant and practical example. Holsti's study of Dulles definitely indicated that a decision-maker can possess great amounts of information, a great deal of skill, and nearly every resource possibly helpful to a reasoned and "rational" (in Verba's sense) decision; and yet still be significantly influenced by unconscious and inappropriate motivations.⁶⁸ Dulles' perceptions were warped, his judgement in cases was faulty, and his experts' advice went unheeded. Granted that this represents an exceptional instance, it still explicitly demonstrates that the foreign policy analyst cannot ignore the unconscious, non-logical, inappropriate, or idiosyncratic type of variable when devising a framework for decisional analysis.

It appears that the best approach to take at present is to first clarify the conceptualization of motivation -- the "in order to" and "because of" distinction does not seem either viable or clear. Besides the difficulties mentioned immediately above, there was also the possibility of confusing the sociological and psychological which could lead to levels-of-analysis problems. What I would suggest is that Snyder divide his personality

variables into conscious and unconscious motivations. After this, he should further break up the former category into two sub-categories -- the group-oriented and the individual-oriented types of conscious motivation.⁶⁹ The way would now be clear for Snyder to emphasize a "sociological conception of personality", but it would be clear that he was speaking of only one type of motivation -- namely the conscious, group-oriented -- without dismissing the other possibilities.

Verba's discussion of the operation of group processes in decision-making is indeed excellent and provides a clear consolidation of what I term the group-oriented and personal-oriented motivations. Verba suggests that the interaction of the group serves as a "filtering process" which screens or inhibits the individual actor's idiosyncratic drives from becoming determinants of any foreign-policy decision.

Insofar as a decision is made within a group context in which the individual's decision or attitude is visible to others the opportunity for a decision or attitude to perform personality-oriented functions will be limited.⁷⁰

Each person may have both individual and group motivations; but when these are brought into action with those of others, usually all but the "lowest common denominator", in this case the group-oriented motivations, are rejected as decisional influences. This is perhaps the best way in

which to understand Snyder's argument on motivation.

The presence of a dominant leader in any group will tend to result in the decisions of that body exhibiting an indication of his personality variables, Verba argues. He furthers this line of thought by stating that if all the members of a group are individually motivated in a peculiar or idiosyncratic fashion, then the decisions of that group will tend to show an exaggerated effect of this "personality" factor.⁷¹ Dulles' singular effect on the foreign policy of the United States would support the first proposition; while the accumulation of a group of psychotic and hostile personalities has been offered as a possible explanation of the extermination practices of Hitler's selected advisors and organizations. Both of these arguments once again indicate that the decision-making analyst cannot dismiss the examination of other types of motivations.⁷²

Finally, it should be noted that use of the words rational, non-rational, and irrational is best avoided in a discussion of motivation. The association of these terms with the psychological traits of any individual decision-maker introduces confusion and tends to imply abnormalities or peculiarities to those motivations which are not in accordance with the group's foreign policy goals.

D. Rationality

After dismissing the value of applying any psychological notion of "rational", such as Verba uses, to

foreign policy decision-making, the reader may doubt if any purpose will be served by continuing discussion on the topic. However, as noted previously, two distinct concepts of rationality are possible; and it is therefore the alternative, but more basic notion, which will now be considered. "Rational" will refer to an ideal type of decision-maker who behaves in a certain pre-ordained fashion in any situation. Thus, the economic or game theory analyst utilizes the conception of the rational actor as an assumption on which to base ideal results or calculate maximum possible outcomes.

Expanding on this principle of rationality, Edwards in speaking of the theoretical "economic man" designates three assumptions. First of all, the actor is in possession of complete information as to his alternative courses of action and their respective outcomes. This gives rise to the second assumption, namely that man is infinitely sensitive to the possibilities and opportunities about him; and thirdly to the postulate that he can order all these available outcomes into a series of preferences, invariably choosing that one which maximizes his expected gain, i.e., expected "utility".⁷³ The final two-part notion is the most important; indeed it is sometimes referred to as the "rationality" assumption. For decision-making purposes, however, the more inclusive set of conditions is most common. Social scientists, particularly Herbert

Simon, have modified the conception of "maximizing behavior" into one of "satisfying behavior" in order to apply rationality to more realistic situations. Simon's theory conceives of a "bounded rationality" where the individual considers all information available to him, attempts some ordering of preferences, and then selects that option which provides a "good enough" or best possible result under the conditions present.⁷⁴

Both Edwards and Simon have, in effect, constructed model actors with prescribed behavior patterns. The theoretician regards the rational decision-maker as an ideal type or paradigm for analytical purposes only. Using this model actor, he can predict events on the basis of static environmental conditions and not have to involve himself with variables such as human interaction or personal idiosyncracies. As Kaplan comments, the ideal type represents "the perfect specimen" or "the terminus of any ordering" or classification.⁷⁵ It follows that after having conceptualized the rational decision-maker, the researcher then proceeds to study the deviations from this standard which are exhibited in reality.

A further aspect of the rationality model is its use as a typical representative of a large class of individual units, thus allowing generalizations across broad categories. The economist, for example, regards "economic man" as a specimen consumer and upon this fundamental

assumption constructs his models and theories of the market economy. However, other writers do not realize the specific and particular conditions surrounding such usage and consequently misconceive of "rationality"-speaking of the behavior of a collective entity. This is similar to the previous discussion on group motivation, and for the same reasons group rationality is not a viable concept. In international relations, those analysts who personify or reify the nation state continue to speak of rational foreign policies, right and wrong decisions and so on. Such notions have no operational foundation and should be avoided. Renouvin and Duroselle pursue the argument, attempting to suggest some method of analyzing a rational, national foreign policy. Their conclusion, however, reinforces my opinion that "rationality" is not applicable to this topic.

We may experimentally conclude, then, that in foreign policy decisions, . . . the notion of a decision's rationality is completely relative. The best decision is not necessarily one where the decision maker sought to act rationally. The main thing is success, and one can succeed by luck, by chance, by virtue of the intervention of an unforeseen element (for instance, an error by the opponent). The rational attitude is, as far as possible, to play all one's cards, but ultimately, at the moment of decision, it is sometimes necessary to be able to dare, to risk, to take a chance.⁷⁶

Centering the remainder of the discussion on foreign policy decision-making, and the use of rationality strictly as a referent to individual decision-makers, Verba's work on this subject again becomes relevant. He clearly states that the rationality model is a simplification which facilitates

the analysis of decision-making by allowing one to "consider all decision-makers to be alike."⁷⁷ Specific rules describe the behavior of the individuals involved, and dictate exactly which variables are to be considered and which can be avoided. Significantly, the use of the rational actor allows the analyst to ignore all psychological or idiosyncratic aspects of the decision-makers.⁷⁸ This follows from the fact that everyone is assumed to respond in exactly the same manner; ruling out any variables which would introduce particularly unique perceptions or motivations.

However, Verba does admit of difficulties in applying rationality models to foreign policy decision-making. Some of his modifications correspond to those of Simon's mentioned earlier. They point out that no human being can ever perceive or evaluate total environmental information; thus changing one's focus from the "best alternative" to "an adequate alternative" in the presence of conflicting situations and preferences.⁷⁹ Rationality models further impose unrealistic distinctions between the means and ends in any decision context; Verba cites Lindblom and others who maintain that no precise separation can be made within the human mind concerning values, goals, and modes of activity.⁸⁰ Perhaps more significantly, policy decisions in international relations are made by a group and not an individual. This, once again, raises the problem of the "mystique of wholes", and Verba admits that arriving at a value ordering and preference indication for a group is virtually "logically

impossible."⁸¹

The combination of these objections with those of Renouvin and Duroselle, who maintained that any notion of rationality was merely relative to the observer, his nation, and his personality, has caused most foreign policy analysts to attempt to operate without any conceptions as to either rationality or irrationality. For example, the Stanford studies on World War I stated:

We suspect rationality and irrationality . . . of being generally subjective concepts and would not be surprised to find their criteria differing across time, across cultures, and even across classes and occupations. We are looking for consistency and inconsistency in [decision-making.]⁸²

Thus, other concepts are being substituted for rationality -- North and his group used consistency -- Fagen feels that one should speak of calculated and emotion "styles" of decision-making.⁸³ However, Snyder argues that the notion may be dispensed with altogether.

My own feeling is that, on balance, decision-making needs a phenomenological approach. Hence no rational actor is assumed in the present scheme and the observer's criteria are not imposed on the actor.⁸⁴

Two reasons are really involved in this single statement. First of all, Snyder wishes to avoid an intrusion by the observer into the situation -- the use of a rationality model would involve not only the implementation of assumptions by the analyst but also the use of his

judgement in concluding whether or not a particular behavior was rational given the decision-maker's values and goals. Secondly, by adopting a phenomenological approach, Snyder has specifically rejected any structuring of the situation by other than the decision-maker himself. A rationality model would impose a means-ends analysis on decision-making studies, ignoring the fact that in most cases the actor's definition of the situation is not performed in this fashion.

However, in the consideration of the observer-participant distinction above, I pointed out that Snyder is unrealistic in maintaining that no assumptions or models of any kind be used in decision-making analysis. An observer is automatically involved in any study, and it was argued that it is methodologically impossible for him not to use some minimal behavioral model to structure his investigation.⁸⁵ The Sprouts carry this point further by maintaining that not only must there be some model of behavior, but that this guide necessarily involves at least three types of assumptions -- assumptions as to motivation, as to the actor's knowledge, and as to his selection of an alternative.⁸⁶ I am prepared to argue that Snyder unobtrusively inserts these features into his theoretical framework, and further that his behavioral model closely approximates one suggested by the Sprouts -- designated a model of "common-sense probablism".⁸⁷ The reader should note that I am attempting to evolve a strategy which will bolster rather

than denigrate Snyder's decision-making schema. This may involve taking the Sprouts' model past the point they wish to argue, but I feel it is useful in indicating that some model is fundamental to Snyder's work. Furthermore, this model should be made explicit.

The Sprouts state that:

A familiar version of behavioral model, derived largely, one suspects, from classical economics, might be called "commonsense probablism". In this ubiquitous but rarely articulated model, men are presumed to be predominantly acquisitive, adequately knowledgeable, and generally rational.⁸⁸ (*italics mine*)

Going a bit further into the third notion, which is central to our present concern; what is implied by rational is some sort of means-ends analysis subject to the knowledge and capabilities of the decision-maker.⁸⁹ In concluding this description of "commonsense probablism", the authors introduce a final, essential condition.

Built into commonsense probablism is the implicit assumption that the actor upon the field, so to speak, and the analyst who observes (or researches) from the sideline both perceive and evaluate the milieu of the actor in substantially the same way.⁹⁰

Now given this outline, it appears to me that Snyder employs just such a minimal notion of a behavioral model in his writing. Regarding the first premise of acquisitiveness, I think this corresponds to Snyder's comment that behavior is purposeful -- "activities are more or less explicitly motivated and behavior is not random."⁹¹ As to being

knowledgeable, I must confess that I could not find any explicit statement in the decision-making framework to this end. However, given the material which Snyder does present, plus the fact that he is concerned with the activities of a national elite, i.e., foreign policy officials, I think this assumption may be accepted.⁹² And finally, although Snyder is adamant in denying a rational model, his several discussions of the "discrimination and relating of objects", the "definition of goals", the "attachment of significance", and the use of "standards of acceptability" as well as the idea that "choice involves valuation and evaluation. . . . [w]eights and priorities are then assigned to alternative projects"⁹³, evidence the hidden assumption that the decision-maker is "generally rational".⁹⁴ With this final point I would again repeat that Snyder appears to have a model of commonsense probabilism in his framework that should be made more explicit in providing guidelines to the researcher.⁹⁵

SECTION III

Snyder's ambition was not just to devise a decision-making model which was theoretically sophisticated and precise, but to see his method of analysis applied to the study of actual foreign policy decisions. Section III is designed to examine to what extent Snyder was successful in achieving this latter goal, in other words, to discover the operational properties of his concepts and the testability of his hypotheses. It will be necessary, therefore, to look not only at those case studies which have already utilized the decision-making approach, but also to estimate the "potential" which rests in Snyder's schema on which future studies may be based. Briefly, the argument presented will follow these lines: An application of the original author's criteria to their own work exposes some serious shortcomings in the decision-making framework as set out in the 1954 monograph. Given these limitations, how successful have Snyder and particularly Paige been in their work on the United States' decision in 1950 to enter the Korean War?¹ Indeed, a more important issue becomes the entire question of the case study and its relation to decision-making theory. Here problems of comparability and generalization require consideration. And lastly, I will attempt to illustrate one way in which Snyder's framework might be

adjusted so as to make it more useful and operational for the foreign policy investigator.

Considerable confusion later on can be avoided by now making a brief digression to dispense with the criticism that Snyder is talking about international relations as a whole. Except for several comments very near the beginning of their writings, it has been apparent that attention is restricted to intranational decision-making situations.² Certainly, it is hoped that after numerous studies, conclusions may be derived indicating that different states formulate their foreign policies in certain similar or dissimilar fashions. However, this cross-national theorizing can in no way be equated with the international interaction of nation states. Rosenau argues a more subtle and valid point, I think, when he maintains that Snyder's focus is actually only on one facet of foreign policy theory making -- namely that particular small duration of time and official organization environment during which, and in which, a single issue is given a precise response. This does not correspond to research on a national foreign policy per se, since the development of the decision inputs and the implementation and outcome of the chosen course of action are never dealt with.³ Policy-making is not composed of one discrete instant, but rather of a series of decisions each dependent for its solution on the outcome of the previous one. (Thus, Rosenau maintains

that "feedback" variables are essential -- but they do not enter Snyder's plan.⁴ He states on two occasions:

It seems insufficient to describe foreign policy solely in decisional terms. The central unit of action is too multi-dimensional to be seen merely as a choice that officials make among conflicting alternatives.⁵

As the concept of decision-making has developed in foreign policy research, it refers to activity at a particular moment in time and does not allow for the sequential nature of the behavior that initiates, sustains, and terminates foreign policy efforts.⁶

Without continuing on into an exploration of the intricacies of the Rosenau conception of foreign policy and his uses of decision-making, I think one must accept his limitation of the Snyder framework.⁷ Therefore, during the duration of the discussion, it will be understood that the operationalization, or application, of decision-making is relevant only to the actual activity of selecting a course of action.

The initial 1954 version of the decision-making approach was variously labelled "a frame of reference", "a conceptual scheme", or "an interpretative scheme".⁸ All these terms were to suggest that Snyder and his co-authors were attempting to construct a framework which departed from the inert formulations of previous writers. Decision-making as defined by Snyder was to have the ability to be active and dynamic in its promotion of research, which in turn was to promote modifications in the original theory. As was pointed out, "an interpretative scheme" is an

exercise in effective and explicit conceptualization, which must meet "three kinds of tests: operational, predictive, and efficiency."⁹ This means that a mere listing of relevant variables involved in decision-making is not adequate; "hypothetical links among variables must be located or preferably spelt out in some detail."¹⁰ Obviously, Snyder was most interested in the application of his work to foreign policy research.

However, the resultant decision-making format did not meet its authors' own standards. Their monograph was essentially a bare enumeration of many variables; no attempt being made to suggest connections, weights, priorities, or relationships among the isolated factors. Snyder neglected exactly that aspect of his work which would have provided the stepping-stone, so to speak, to its implementation in actual case studies. Little concern was shown for the methods and means of operationalizing the key concepts, such as the "definition of the situation"; furthermore, the writers tended to emphasize certain issues more than others -- leaving a finished product which is alternately sophisticated and rough or crude. As Rosenau critically points out, the decision-making approach was built around three sets of environmental factors (internal, external, and decision-making); however, only one -- the decision-making setting itself -- was given adequate attention.¹¹ The domestic and foreign influences upon foreign policy

formulation were passed over too quickly.

This major criticism of Snyder's framework has been expressed and discussed to the extent that is generally accepted as fact rather than argument. Among others McClosky, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Singer have all taken virtually the same stand.¹² Perhaps the most noteworthy of comments was Snyder's admission, when writing in the preface to Paige's book, that

there were two serious weaknesses among others which bear acknowledgement here: (1) the basic factors (in the technical sense, variables) postulated to exert influence on the process and outcome of decisions were not spelled out precisely enough to permit the investigator to identify referents in the real world; (2) no hypotheses linking the variables were stated, and therefore no bases for prediction existed and no explanation -- even post hoc -- was possible without further operations implied by the scheme but certainly not set forth in the initial version.¹³

Further examples and supporting quotations would, I think, soon come to belabor the obvious. What is more germane and valuable is a consideration as to what precisely precipitated this state of affairs.

Any inquiry aimed at achieving explanation and/or prediction involves what is known to the social scientist as independent and dependent variables. Put as simply as possible, this means that there will be certain factors, or pre-behavioral characteristics, taken as the focii of examination (the independent variables) which the investigator regards as the determinants of the events of behavior (the dependent

variable) in which he is interested. The purpose of research, therefore, is to construct the linkages between the observed variations in the independent variables and the resulting changes introduced in the dependent variables. It is essential, however, that these analytical categories be specified; since without their clear delineation, the analyst has no foundation upon which to even commence an examination. McClosky points out that Snyder, in his obsession for the inclusion of every possible variable, has neglected to indicate how or which factors are to be taken as independent variables so that specific changes or alterations in them may be related to subsequent differences in decisional behavior.¹⁴

Marion Levy expresses the same argument by accusing Snyder of committing the "fallacy of the abandoned model" continuing to note that

so well aware were Professor Snyder and his associates of all things that could influence decision-making that practically all the fat that had been cut off the problem by focusing on decision-making was brought back by the realization that there was nothing that ever happened on any level of generality that was not in some way relevant to decision-making.¹⁵

I would maintain that if decision-making is to be operationalized, it will first be necessary to choose and discriminate among the myriad of possible variables, selecting for study several which appear to account for the most "variance" or change in the foreign policy selection process. Levy

comments, somewhat arbitrarily, that any investigation can cope effectively with only six independent variables.¹⁶

Presumably, a theory containing more (of course, a better phrase would be "containing a great number of") variables has not been adequately inter-related and refined to support actual research. This is certainly the case with Snyder's decision-making framework, as evidenced in the attempts to deal with the Korea decision.

Specifically looking at these case studies, Snyder and Paige produced their first work in 1958, which was not followed until 1968 by the more comprehensive examination in Paige's book The Korean Decision.¹⁷ In these studies the majority of the possible variables listed in the conceptual scheme were not examined. Very little, if any, attention was given to the influence of Snyder's external setting, i.e., the effects of opinions, influences, and pressures from other countries. As far as the internal setting was concerned, Paige, restricting his analysis to that small number of people in the decisional unit, appears to have considered really only a sampling of newspaper editorials, and the manner in which the select decision-makers perceived these. In The Korean Decision the unit of observation itself was very small and was dominated by the presence of one man -- the president. Even under these limited conditions, it was found necessary for reasons of data availability and access, to make broad assumptions

especially about personality type variables. Snyder and Paige left out these factors altogether, while Paige took as motivational indicators only explicitly expressed "value" statements. (By this, he meant actual comments as to desired goals and means.)¹⁸

Possibly the most difficulty was experienced in operationalizing the "definition of the situation", for as Snyder and Paige noted "this concept was not operational as formulated because there were no clear guidelines for coding data in terms of it."¹⁹ And yet it is exactly this notion which is the key to the Snyder framework. In both studies, it proved necessary to specify a priori guidelines which the analyst could use in selecting and assessing situational material. Another important point is that, in keeping with my previous argument, Paige organized his research around an independent variable -- the crisis situation.²⁰ Borrowing largely from the work of C.F. Hermann,²¹ the various characteristics of a crisis, "short time period", "seriousness of the event", and "surprise", served as the basis for propositions or hypotheses, which in turn provided direction and purpose to the actual analysis of decision-making. As I maintained before, some ordering conception, some notion of independent variable, is prerequisite to the application of Snyder's framework to foreign policy. Referring now particularly to Paige's work, given the numerous shortcomings of the conceptual scheme and the resultant restrictive

assumptions introduced into the investigation, the largest portion of The Korean Decision may be classified as an historical reconstruction -- not a study in the "why" of decision-making. By far the greater portion of the text is devoted to narrative and background. Only in those areas where Paige advances and tests propositions about behavior in foreign policy crises situations does this study approach the original ideas of Snyder.

On the other hand, the reader should be careful to keep this criticism of Paige in the proper perspective. The focus of our discussion has been on the degree to which it was possible to operationalize Snyder's framework, and it was seen that problems which were first noted theoretically, i.e., the lack of hypotheses, for instance, appeared as a hindrance to practical research as well. In its own right, The Korean Decision evidences conscientious scholarship and careful analysis. It is much better to admit, as Paige did, that he could not handle Snyder's scheme, and then proceed to use those portions he could, than to attempt to "squeeze" data into a model which was not suitable or comprehensive. Although it is doubtful if either Snyder or Paige would wish to acknowledge this point, I feel Paige's work can be grouped with that growing body of literature on "crisis decision-making".²²

The consideration of the few instances where Snyder's framework has been involved naturally leads to

more general questions concerning any case study in foreign policy decision-making, both during the past and in the future. A possible paradox presents itself in that although a general theory of decision-making depends on the accumulation of numerous investigations to achieve generalizations, each individual case study appears to be moving in exactly the opposite direction by attempting to discover the unique aspects, or the "why", of the particular decision. Undoubtedly, each and every event possesses distinctive features; and therefore, if every case study exhaustively sets forth to delineate them all, little of a more general nature will be accomplished. The answer to the situation, simply put by Snyder, is to stop concentrating on differences and start looking for, and at, uniformities.²³ On a more theoretical plane, what is implied is that the analyst must compare and generalize across instances; what is further involved prior to this is the establishment of some a priori standards or bases on which to construct these comparisons. However, this is exactly where the Snyder formulation is faulty, in that it concentrates on inclusiveness of minute variables rather than sacrificing detail to allow some inter-relationships to be set up. Snyder refuses to allow the validity of assumptions or guidelines made by the observer, and these will contaminate the implementation of the phenomenological point of view. This argument then becomes similar to that earlier expressed concerning the necessity of specifying independent variables in the decision-making

framework.

To return for a moment to the problems of comparability and case studies, which are common to all social science, Singer, for example, acknowledges that no two events are "exactly alike", but goes on to state:

That need not deflect us though since similarity need not extend to every attribute of the subject cases, but only those which concern us at the moment. . . .

The question, then, is how we can ascertain whether or not there is a sufficient degree of similarity among many cases, events, or conditions to permit us to generalize across such cases.²⁴

This decision as to the possibility of generalization can only come from the observer and the assumptions or hypotheses of his framework. He must conceive of the case study approach in such a manner that he realizes just how far he can generalize across situations, and at the same point, how he is to approach the study of the apparent differences. Taking the liberty of quoting extensively: Paige's argument provides an excellent summation of this issue.

In constructing and in interpreting a single case there are several persistent problems which the analyst must solve or at least appreciate. These include questions about: (1) the boundaries of the case -- what is to be included or excluded; (2) the level of case comparability to be sought -- the extent to which the case method employed will permit replication and comparison; (3) the representativeness of the case -- the universe of behaviors to which the case findings are hypothesized to apply; and (4) the adequacy of explanation -- questions concerning the relative merits of competing explanatory hypotheses, including choices among internationally induced and externally introduced explanations.²⁵

Snyder's decision-making framework requires refinement with the additional development of hypotheses that link up different variables, which are generally applicable to numerous situations, and which can be tested in other or succeeding studies. Snyder and Paige further suggest that variables themselves should be consolidated into "typologies" which would reduce and structure subsequent analysis and facilitate the greater use of decision-making.

However, before expanding on the notion of the "typology", a short detour will be taken to raise another issue involved in the application of Snyder's schema to foreign policy decisions. No solution will be offered to this question, but I feel the matter is of significant import to be brought up. Until now, consideration has been implicitly restricted to case studies of past events, and hence, the "explanation" of the behaviors involved. But Snyder held that a satisfactory "interpretative scheme" should further allow the study of present happenings, and thus, the "prediction" of foreign policy decisions.²⁶ This raises a serious problem. Is the decision-making framework restricted to ex post facto analysis, i.e., of past events, or can it be developed to a point where the analyst will be capable of making statements about future events? Presumably, one answer to this question would be "yes"; accompanied by the argument that once sufficient numbers of foreign policy decisions are studied, patterns and trends of behavior will

emerge, allowing the analyst to project these findings with "reasonable" accuracy onto decisions not yet formulated.²⁷ However, the Sprouts argue that Snyder's adoption of the phenomenological perspective logically prevents any but ex post facto studies. They argue, correctly I think, that it is impossible to reconstruct a "definition of the situation" before the fact, since this is essentially dependent on the particular, individual decision-makers involved and cannot be anticipated. "One cannot investigate empirically a decision or any other event that has not occurred. So-called 'probing the minds' of decision-makers is a historical, not a predictive, mode of analysis."²⁸ Given this reasoning, if Snyder wished to extend his theory into foreign policy prediction, he would have to abandon his phenomenological point of view, and be prepared to postulate motivational and personality assumptions operative in future situations. As mentioned earlier, no real attempt will be made to resolve this difficulty, since it is somewhat peripheral to our more general concerns regarding detailed definitional problems concerning the distinction, if any, between "explanation" and "prediction". However, the matter illustrates an additional problem (to those mentioned in Section II) related to the operationalization of the "definition of the situation".

Returning to the previous line of thought, "typology" is a concept which, if developed, would considerably advance the applicability of Snyder's scheme.

Essentially, a typology is a grouping of phenomena or data or analytical structures according to assumed or verified common properties. Thus, "factors" which otherwise have unique properties of different properties can be considered as potentially relatable under limited conditions. This facilitates the search for comparability as well as relationships.²⁹

An example may perhaps better indicate what is involved, and Hermann's work will be used for the moment. A typology involves the classification or ordering of variables which have a common property. Thus, Hermann developed a "typology of situations" by consolidating the variables of time, surprise, and importance of issue into a compact model or schema.³⁰ The analyst now uses the notion of the "type of situation" as a factor in decision-making, rather than having to separately consider time, surprise, and importance as individual features of the event. A substantial simplification of investigation results, as well as a basis upon which the researcher can compare foreign policy decisions as to whether or not they took place in similar or different "situations". Referring back to an earlier passage, the typology is in essence an enlarged "independent variable" which is assumed to affect the decision-making outcome.³¹

Increased usage of typologies by foreign policy analysts would definitely solve some of the problems associated with the use of Snyder's approach on case studies. The matter of inter-relating "small" variables is solved by the very nature of the typology, i.e., a number of them in effect make up the typology. Hypotheses and propositions

upon which to base analysis are immediately suggested as well as a foundation upon which to generalize to other decisional studies. Snyder's goal of a broad foreign policy theory will inevitably have to be based on numerous typologies.

Another advantage of the typology (speaking now about 1954) was that it provided a so-called "division of labor" in foreign policy research, breaking up a vast expanse of material into manageable portions for investigation. Thus, by 1969, there now exists a number of well-developed typologies which can and should be used in the more general research Snyder conceptualized. Without providing an exhaustive listing, the following writers have developed models, or "independent variables" or typologies in the foreign policy field: Hermann, of course, with "situations"; and Braybrooke and Lindblom in the same area,³² Fagen with "styles of decision-making",³³ the Stanford model of crises analysis;³⁴ and one of the most interesting typologies, that of d'Amato's on "personality constructs in foreign policy".³⁵

I would maintain that future case study work should be based on the use of these combinations of variables. What is "lost" to Snyder by this a priori structure of the analysis, and the use of assumptions by an observer, is more than amply compensated for by the increased relevance and generality of decision-making findings based on the involvement of typologies.

CONCLUSION

In each of the previous sections, Snyder's foreign policy theory was considered from a different perspective. Section I was largely descriptive -- merely setting out the basic decision-making assumptions and then showing how a foreign policy schema could be based upon this foundation. The latter two Sections contained examinations of problems of theoretical construction and problems in the practical application of the Snyder framework, respectively.

Section II pointed out four difficulties. First of all, despite arguments to the contrary, decision-making research can proceed only through the eyes of an observer whose effect on the analysis may be diminished but not eliminated. If the reader accepts my reasoning concerning Snyder's implicit use of assumptions of "commonsense probabilism", this "reduced" rationality model may be seen as a necessary device employed by the observer to help impose order on complicated situations. The remaining two topics of Section II centered on the confusion introduced by Snyder's attempt to combine sociological and psychological levels-of-analysis. It was demonstrated that this would involve trying to combine the individual and the collective level-of-analysis, which is logically invalid. However, the decision-making schema could be clarified to avoid this

possible error, as the somewhat detailed discussion of the "motivation" variable in foreign policy issues attempted to indicate.

Attention in Section III was given to the applicability of the framework to actual national policy decisions, as exemplified by Paige's work on the United States entry into the Korean War. Essentially the same position was expressed as has been taken by other writers, criticizing the absence of testable hypotheses in Snyder's formulation. The enumeration of all possible relevant variables which may effect foreign policy cannot in itself suggest the linkages between these variables upon which theories can be founded. Furthermore, key concepts such as "the definition of the situation" were shown to be too broad and too abstract to be operationalized. Before an encompassing theory of foreign policy decision-making is achieved, prior testing of limited aspects of the Snyder schema should be tried. This could lead to the construction of "typologies" or clusterings of variables appropriate to major concepts in the framework such as "personality" or "situation". This intermediate research would provide the foundation upon which to build a more general theory of foreign policy.

However, this series of criticisms, even though valid, tends to obscure the good features and the advantages of Snyder's proposals. His work marked a very distinct departure from previous scholarship in international

relations and foreign policy. When seen in this light, in contrast to contemporary authors who have much more background material in political science with which to work, the impact and importance of the idea of decision-making research in foreign policy becomes apparent.

In 1954, the argument that states were to be seen as single personified actors on the international scene was common. Snyder forcefully demonstrated that this method was inadequate, that it oversimplified matters, and committed the error of attributing characteristics of an individual to what was in fact a huge organization, or group of citizens. Certainly other writers had gone to the other extreme and regarded state behavior merely as the outcome of the activities of an outstanding or unusual leader, e.g. Hitler, or even Churchill. But Snyder showed that foreign policy decisions were best seen as the product of the behaviors and interactions of groups of persons charged with acting on behalf of their country. No longer was the state to be viewed as a monolithic entity; conflict, negotiation, bargaining, and influencing all take place during a decision formulation. An analysis of these within nation circumstances and activity was, for Snyder, essential to the understanding of a country's foreign policy. This basic position has since been accepted by almost all writers in the foreign policy field. Although they may disagree over matters of relevance or significance of different factors,

this major point remains a keystone in present foreign policy analysis and the literature of this field.

It is also important to note that Snyder felt that a national foreign policy could be compartmentalized into a series of discrete decision-making events. Associated with each new incident was a separate group of decision-makers (overlapping of personnel would occur, of course, but some factors would make each decisional environment different). Foreign policy analysis was very much intranational rather than international politics. Snyder had no real pretensions of encompassing the whole of international activities within his schema; on the contrary, his work served to delimit foreign policy research from other concerns. Rosenau's criticisms deserve mention in that he objects that Snyder tries to study foreign policy as a series of disjointed instances, when in fact such national policy making is a more continuous process involving concepts of change over time and the feedback of information and opinion. This points out that the two authors view foreign policy in quite different fashions -- whereas Snyder's framework is more applicable to those foreign policy decisions which are decided quickly and decisively, such as crises; Rosenau's framework is more amenable to the study of longer-range, more incremental foreign policy formation. Present writers should keep this distinction in mind before dismissing either Snyder's or Rosenau's model.

The Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin work exhibited a broad, inter-disciplinary scope with its inclusion of psychological, sociological, and organization-theory material. Such a wide perspective had not been applied to the study of foreign policy before; few if any political scientists were willing to acknowledge the relevance of other social science literature. However, Snyder and his co-authors clearly demonstrated that many important variables in the foreign policy area were being left out by contemporary writers, and that a widening of their outlook was essential. Indeed, the adoption of the "decision-making" context itself constituted a major borrowing from business administration and sociological studies. The inclusion of proposals to systematically study such things as "motivation", "personality", and "group interaction", which up until this time had been regarded as unique facets of each case, subject only to analysis by biographers and autobiographers, constituted an additional major departure from former work. For Snyder was not only suggesting that individuals could and should be studied by an outside observer, he was establishing a prescribed and inclusive framework in which this study should take place. By utilizing his perspective and his method, it would become possible to compare decision-making behaviors from instance to instance, and from country to country. All of these points add weight to the argument that the Snyder framework, while increasing the scope and breadth of foreign policy study, attempted at

the same time to structure and organize research around key concepts, e.g. communication, information, competence, and motivation. (In Section III, I argued that the absence of hypotheses between the many variables precluded application of the framework to national policy decisions. While still acknowledging this fact, the present discussion draws attention to the more basic notions of Snyder's listing of the relevant variables and sketching of boundaries for foreign policy research which had not been accomplished prior to this data.)

The introduction of psychological and sociological into foreign policy analysis was most prominent in Snyder's continual emphasis on the necessity to adopt the perspective of the individual actor -- "the definition of the situation", "the phenomenological point of view". Much of the earlier discussion centered on these ideas and criticized ambiguities in the proposed "conceptual scheme" concerning "rationality", "motivation", the necessity of an observer, and the possible confusion of levels-of-analysis. Looking beyond these difficulties for the moment, the significance of Snyder's strong stand on this matter cannot be overlooked. In essence, he was proposing a "behavioral" analysis for foreign policy research. (I hesitate to use this term, given its varied, and not altogether favorable, connotations in present political science.) The idea, that individual actions comprise and determine the resultant

decisional outcome in a foreign policy situation can legitimately be termed a "behavioral" point of view. By advocating this position, Snyder not only set himself apart from the majority of writers in foreign policy, but also from many political scientists in other fields not yet influenced by the "behavioral revolution" which was prevalent in the late 1950's. However, my argument at this point is not concerned with evaluating the merits of Snyder's stand, but rather to show that this author's work constituted an important innovation in foreign policy analysis which has had far-reaching effects.

Given his move away from states as individual actors, his broad acceptance of relevant material in other disciplines, and his organization of the field of foreign policy analysis about the individual decision-makers and their environment, Snyder established a framework or foundation which has not yet been substantially altered or challenged. As was indicated above, the work of contemporary authors such as Hermann, Holsti, North and Zinnes may be regarded as expansions of issues which arose from Snyder's work. The theories of foreign policy since advocated by Frankel, Rosenau, and others may alter the emphasis given to different factors in policy formation, or may more carefully construct linkages between possible relevant variables, but they do not maintain that Snyder was substantially incorrect in any matter. The significance of

his contribution to foreign policy analysis since his original work of 1954 should not go unacknowledged or unappreciated by contemporary scholars.

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

¹R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, B. Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics", Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: Free Press, 1962).

²R.C. Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena", Approaches to the Study of Politics, edited by R. Young (Urbana, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1958).

³R.C. Snyder and G.D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme", Administrative Science Quarterly, III (December, 1958), pp. 341-378.

⁴R.C. Snyder and J. Robinson, National and International Decision-Making (New York: New York Institute for World Order, 1961).

⁵J. Robinson and R.C. Snyder, "Decision-Making in International Politics", International Behavior, edited by H.C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 433-463.

⁶Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 7.

⁷Marion J. Levy, "'Does It Matter If He's Naked?' Bawled the Child", Contending Approaches to International Politics, edited by K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

Section I

¹Snyder and Paige, p. 365.

²Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 37.

³Ibid., p. 37.

⁴To introduce some points which Snyder does not raise, but which I find explicate what he is speaking about in a more lucid and broader context, the reader is referred to:

H. Sprout and M. Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

⁵Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 39.

⁶Ibid., p. 39.

⁷Ibid., p. 39.

⁸Snyder, p. 10.

⁹Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 60.

¹⁰The reader will notice that the difference between static and dynamic rests on notions of continuous and separate moments of time, which in turn is dependent on one's interpretation of the concepts of "simultaneity" and the "divisibility of time". Snyder does not take this matter up, but does admit that the original dichotomy is not unambiguous. Snyder, p. 10.

¹¹Snyder, p. 11.

¹²Specifically, in those essays by these men found in T. Parsons and E.A. Shils, editors, Toward a General Theory in Action (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1951).

¹³Snyder, p. 11.

¹⁴Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 64.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 80-81.

¹⁶H. and M. Sprout; and also Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 92.

¹⁷Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 60.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁹"A person's psycho-milieu does not consist of phenomena external to his physical organism. His psycho-milieu consists rather of images or ideas, derived from some sort of interaction between what he selectively receives from his milieu (via his sensory apparatus) and his scheme of values, conscious memories, and subconsciously stored experience." H. and M. Sprout, p. 28.

²⁰Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 66.

²¹Snyder and Paige, pp. 372-373.

²²Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 88-89.

²³Ibid., p. 90.

²⁴Ibid., p. 90.

²⁵Ibid., p. 9.

²⁶This point should be emphasized since subsequent critics of the Snyder approach accuse him of grandiose, but fruitless, attempts to include the totality of international politics. On the other hand, Snyder does allow room for confusion on this point by commenting (somewhat verbosely) that his purpose was to "present a tentative formulation of an analytical scheme which may serve as the core of a frame of reference for the study of international politics." Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 17.

I would maintain that the remainder of the text is less optimistic and more carefully delineated.

²⁷Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 32.

²⁸Snyder, without specifically speaking to the subject, appears to align himself with those inductively-oriented theorists who attempt to build "islands of theory" out of specific research findings and thus to gradually approach a more general theory. This is opposed to a deductive theoretician who should desire a significant system of laws and generalization prior to attempting empirical research.

²⁹Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 60.

³⁰Ibid., p. 65 (*italics deleted*).

³¹Snyder, p. 16.

³²"Setting is really a set of categories of potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect the action of any state." Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 67.

³³Ibid., p. 68.

³⁴Ibid., p. 67.

³⁵Ibid., p. 105.

³⁶For the moment no more comment will be made on this, Snyder's attempts to combine "levels-of-analysis". However, I believe this is of serious consequence and will consider it in Section II under "levels-of-analysis".

³⁷Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 106.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 124ff.

³⁹Ibid., p. 130.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 137-173.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 137.

⁴²Ibid., p. 138.

⁴³The problem of transferring individual properties such as values and motivations to collective numbers of actors is a serious theoretical consideration. Snyder does not indicate that he is cognizant of the difficulties, although he does avoid serious "mistakes" and therefore, probably is aware of the question. More will be said of this in Section II.

⁴⁴Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 146.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 140.

⁴⁶Snyder, p. 30.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 30.

⁴⁸Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 144.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 144.

⁵⁰Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, p. 144, and also Snyder, p. 31.

⁵¹Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 148.

⁵²Ibid., p. 149.

⁵³Ibid., p. 150.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 66.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 151.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 152.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 161.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 161.

Section II

¹See Section I above.

²Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, pp. 30-31.

³This distinction was noted by May Brodbeck in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1968), p. 79.

⁴Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 65.

⁵Snyder, p. 11.

⁶Repeating a citation already given, the book referred to is H. Sprout and M. Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). The reader is also referred to the following article which summarizes many of the arguments made in the book: H. Sprout and M. Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics", Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (September, 1957), pp. 309-328. Also note that unless indicated, references to the Sprouts will refer to the book, not the article.

⁷H. and M. Sprout, pp. 48ff.

⁸Ibid., pp. 71ff. and 83ff.

⁹Ibid., pp. 99ff.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 28.

¹¹Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 67.

¹²H. and M. Sprout, pp. 19ff.

¹³It is interesting to note that Rosenau criticizes Snyder for neglecting objective features of the environment and argues that the theory which does so is inadequate. Briefly, however, it must be suggested that the two authors wish to achieve different purposes and understandably employ different methods. Snyder wishes to explain decisional behavior -- Rosenau wishes to really obtain a correlation of decisional inputs and outputs, using decision-making as an intervening variable between the independent and dependent variables. See J.N. Rosenau, "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?", International Studies Quarterly, XII (September, 1968), p. 312ff.

¹⁴See above, Section I.

¹⁵H. and M. Sprout, p. 136.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 136-137.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 106-107.

¹⁸"In some cases it may be necessary to do some detective work to reconstruct the unit. Undoubtably, the observer will have awkward choices to make occasionally as to whether an actor or a function is to be included or excluded. When this is true, the observer will have to choose on the basis of his analytical purposes." Snyder, p. 21.

¹⁹"There being no omniscient observer, there are in practice no infallible criteria as to which factors are most significant. Different observers may bring different criteria to bear. But any outside observer (that is, an observer other than the individual whose achievements are being investigated) will apply some criteria of relevance and significance. And by these criteria he will decide what, in his own judgement, appear to be the significant factors." H. and M. Sprout, p. 30.

²⁰Ibid., p. 107.

²¹See May Brodbeck's book, and Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964).

²²This is close to what Kaplan calls the "locus problem" which may be "described as that of selecting the ultimate subject-matter for inquiry in behavioral science, the attribute space for its description, and the conceptual structure within which hypotheses about it are to be formulated." p. 78.

²³J.D. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", The International System, edited by K. Knorr and S. Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92.

²⁴R.A. Brody, "The Study of International Politics Qua Science", Contending Approaches to International Politics, edited by K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 115.

²⁵Singer, p. 79.

²⁶Ibid., p. 90.

²⁷R.C. North et al., Content Analysis (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 6.

²⁸For a thorough discussion of this and related material, see May Brodbeck's article (in her book) entitled "Methodological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction", pp. 280-303.

²⁹Ibid., p. 299.

³⁰Kaplan, p. 81.

³¹M.J. Levy, p. 99.

³²See H. and M. Sprout, p. 28; and also Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 65.

³³Kaplan, pp. 80-82.

³⁴Brody, p. 114.

³⁵Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics", Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 3-24.

³⁶Ibid., p. 10.

³⁷Ibid., p. 10.

³⁸Ibid., p. 11. Wolfers would like to argue that he has established three methods to be used in only one level-of-analysis -- that of international interaction. However, what he has in effect done is indicated various levels-of-analysis, because his subject matter in each case is not the same. Brody feels that Wolfers has used only two levels-of-analysis -- he combines the last two of Wolfer's perspectives into one. Brody comments further: "We would argue that the 'two angles' are not merely alternative languages for describing the same phenomena; they describe different phenomena." Also they utilize different causal connections, and different analytical techniques, e.g. sociological theory in decision-making and systems theory in international alliances. See R.A. Brody "Cognition and Behavior: A Model of International Relations", Experience Structure and Adaptability, edited by O.J. Harvey (New York: Springer Publishing Co. Inc., 1966), p. 326.

³⁹Ibid., p. 323.

⁴⁰Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 7.

⁴¹Robinson and Snyder, p. 440.

⁴²J.D. Singer, p. 77.

⁴³Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, pp. 105-106.

⁴⁴H. and M. Sprout, pp. 33ff.

⁴⁵R.A. Brody, p. 114.

⁴⁶Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, pp. 137 and 140.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 146.

⁴⁸Ibid., p.p. 140 and 160.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 144.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 161.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 144.

⁵²The reader is correct in sensing a tone of criticism in this passage. However, it is difficult to pursue or pin down Snyder in this area, and I think the issues involved are handled subsequently, but in a different context.

⁵³Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 161.

⁵⁴Snyder's other opinion that there are three aspects to any personality will not be taken up.

⁵⁵As mentioned before, Snyder's reasons for doing this are not made clear.

⁵⁶Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 138.

⁵⁷Wolfers, pp. 10 and 15.

⁵⁸J.C. Harsanyi, "Rational Choice Models of Political Behavior Vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories", World Politics, XXI (July, 1969), p. 518.

⁵⁹A. d'Amato, "Psychological Constructs in Foreign Policy Prediction", Journal of Conflict Resolution, II (September, 1967), pp. 294-311.

⁶⁰J. deRivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: C.E. Merrill and Co., 1968), p. 2.

⁶¹It is certainly possible that after numerous investigations one will find that Snyder is right in maintaining that idiosyncratic features do not need to be considered since they contribute little or nothing of significance. But at the present stage of the decision-making approach, this built-in assumption appears to be premature.

⁶²S. Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System", The International System, edited by K. Knorr and S. Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 92-117.

⁶³Ibid., p. 95.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 94.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 95.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 99.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 100-103.

⁶⁸O.R. Holsti's chapter entitled, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia", in D.J. Finlay, O.R. Holsti, and R.R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967), pp. 25-96.

⁶⁹This idea would be very much like the Verba distinction between appropriate and inappropriate influences.

⁷⁰Verba, p. 103.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 103.

⁷²The writer acknowledges that he has glossed over a quite major question, i.e., how is one to examine the unconscious motives of the decision-maker. The important point, however, is that these factors be acknowledged as present and relevant even if not adequately investigated. For some first steps in this operational direction, the reader is referred to the Finlay book, as well as to the many good biographies of national leaders -- all of which attempt some personality analysis.

⁷³W. Edwards, "The Theory of Decision-Making", Decision-Making, edited by W. Edwards and A. Tversky (Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1967), pp. 14-15.

⁷⁴C.A. McClelland, "Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: The Quemoy Case", Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (September, 1963), p. 207.

⁷⁵Kaplan, p. 83.

⁷⁶P. Renouvin and J.B. Duroselle, Introduction to the History of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 355.

⁷⁷Verba, p. 106. It should be noted that Verba's article is split into two distinct portions. The first consists of the discussion of non-rational, non-logical considerations in decision-making, while the latter deals with the assumptions and usages of the rationality model in international affairs. Whereas his handling of the non-logical area was not without problems, which have been pointed out; the remainder of the article appears sound. It is significant that Verba is not really speaking of the same "rationality" in each half of the discussion, but he

does not indicate, or realize, this fact.

⁷⁸Verba, p. 95.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 113.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 108.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 111.

⁸²R.C. North, "Research Pluralism and the International Elephant", Contending Approaches to International Politics, edited by K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 235-236.

⁸³R.R. Fagen, "Calculation and Emotion in Foreign Policy: The Cuban Case", Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (September, 1962), pp. 214-221.

⁸⁴Snyder, p. 11.

⁸⁵H. and M. Sprout, p. 136.

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 106-107.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 107.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 107.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 107.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 107-108.

⁹¹Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 8.

⁹²Ibid., p. 66, as well as Snyder, p. 17, and the following passage from Snyder and Paige: "In our analysis we have taken an observer's liberty to specify a set of alternative goal and instrumental values at each of the eight stages of the decision-making process. We have done so as a means of locating the alternative course of action chosen by the decision-makers and of logically extending the implications of 'if this course of action, then not that course of action'. Recognizing frankly that this is an analytical fabrication on the part of the observer, we have attempted a verstehen type of operation guided by what a 'reasonable' decision-maker might see as alternatives and by asking the decision-makers if such alternatives might have been considered regardless of whether they were." p. 376.

⁹³Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 91 (*italics deleted*).

⁹⁴The reader might also check through the Snyder and

Paige work more closely to find more evidence for this conclusion.

⁹⁵It will be noted that the final assumption that the Sprouts raised has not been discussed. However, I believe it is particularly evident in the above long quotation from Snyder and Paige, p. 376. This matter will also come up in Section III.

Section III

¹There are basically two works involved here: the R.C. Snyder and G.D. Paige article already cited, and the book by G.D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: Free Press, 1968).

²For the comments concerning the idea of decision-making providing a frame of reference for the whole of international politics, the reader is referred to Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, especially p. 17.

However, the following quotation from J. Robinson and R.C. Snyder deserves attention: "It is accurate to say that many, perhaps most, international decision-making studies are concerned with national foreign policy-making; they are intranational rather than international." p. 436.

³J.N. Rosenau, "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?", International Studies Quarterly, XII (September, 1968), p. 310ff.

⁴Ibid., p. 317.

⁵Ibid., p. 312.

⁶J.N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research", Political Science and Public Policy, edited by A. Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), p. 213.

⁷If the reader is particularly interested in Rosenau's general theory, he is advised to read J.N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, edited by R.B. Farrell (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966) rather than to first approach Rosenau through those articles cited above.

⁸Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, pp. 23 and 26.

⁹Ibid., pp. 21 and 25.

¹⁰Snyder and Paige, p. 344.

¹¹J.N. Rosenau, "Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis", Contemporary Political Analysis, edited by J.C. Charlesworth (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 209.

¹²H. McClosky, "Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics", Foreign Policy Decision-Making, edited by R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and B. Sapin (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 199-200.

S. Hoffman, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory", World Politics, XI (April, 1959), p. 363.

J.N. Rosenau "Premises and Promises . . .", p. 208.

J.D. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis . . .", p. 80.

¹³Paige, p. xiii.

¹⁴McClosky, p. 201.

¹⁵M.J. Levy, p. 103.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 94. For another interesting point on this issue, the reader is referred to J.D. Singer's notion of the N/V ratio -- literally, the number of cases/the number of variables. See J.D. Singer, "The Behavioral Approach to International Relations: Payoff and Prospects", International Politics and Foreign Policy, second edition, edited by J.N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 66.

¹⁷For complete citations please refer to the Bibliography.

¹⁸Paige, p. 8.

¹⁹Snyder and Paige, p. 358.

²⁰Paige, p. xxi.

²¹C.F. Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable", International Politics and Foreign Policy, second edition, edited by J.N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 409-421.

²²In this group of studies, a prominent place goes to the Stanford studies on World War I. However, they are based on very different assumptions and approaches than is Snyder's work. The reader is referred to articles in J.D. Singer's book, Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968).

²³Snyder, p. 9.

²⁴Singer, "The Behavioral Approach . . .", p. 66.

²⁵Paige, p. 11.

²⁶Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 25.

²⁷A number of points should be made here. Firstly, I doubt if anyone would argue that a specific decision-making event will arise in the future; for this would imply a deterministic type of argument. Therefore, by "prediction" must be understood the idea that the situation has arisen, but the decision itself has not been taken.

Secondly, a fine methodological point in that, to the philosopher of science, if one possesses adequate foundations for "explanation", he already has sufficient grounds for "prediction". The one type of analysis is presumed to be no more difficult than the other. However, this appears to be implied in the arguments which I discuss in this area.

²⁸H. and M. Sprout, p. 138.

²⁹Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, pp. 43-44.

³⁰C.F. Hermann, p. 415.

³¹Ibid., p. 409.

³²D. Braybrooke and C.E. Lindblom, "Types of Decision-Making", International Politics and Foreign Policy, second edition, edited by J.N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969).

³³R. Fagen, "Calculation and Emotion"

³⁴The reader is referred to the Singer book mentioned earlier in the notes, Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence.

³⁵A. d'Amato, "Psychological Constructs"

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